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FEw PROFESSIONAL  ECONOMISTS  would  espouse  the view  that  wage  de- 
termination  is the fundamental  cause  of inflation.  But  many  economists- 
and certainly  many policymakers-have the uneasy  sense that the wage 
determination  process  contributes  to the difficulty  in checking  the current 
inflation.  Historically  wages have been at the center of formal and in- 
formal intervention  efforts.  During the Kennedy  and Johnson adminis- 
trations  the voluntary  wage  guidepost  of 3.2 percent  was  the only absolute 
magnitude  suggested  by the Council  of Economic  Advisers.  Prices  were 
basically supposed to follow costs. Because most nonlabor costs are 
simply  all other  prices,  the major  constraint  in the guidepost  program  on 
the inflation  process  operated  through  wages.  A similar  logic applied  dur- 
ing the 1971-74 controls  program  when the 5.5 percent  wage standard 
was promulgated  by the Pay Board.' Again, price controls  were based 
primarily  on cost markups  so that the principal  restraint  on inflation  was 
the impact  of wage determination  on costs. The new guidelines  program 
Note:  I thank Thomas A. Gray for his assistance  in compiling some of the data 
used in the regressions.  The research was supported  by a grant from the Alfred P. 
Sloan Foundation. This paper incorporates information about the Carter adminis- 
tration's new wage-price guidelines that were announced on October 24, after the 
Brookings  panel meeting at which this paper was discussed. 
1. For a discussion of the guidepost period, see John Sheahan, The Wage-Price 
Guideposts (Brookings Institution, 1967). The Pay Board experience is described  in 
Arnold R. Weber and Daniel J. B. Mitchell, The Pay Board's  Progress: Wage Con- 
trols in Phase 11 (Brookings  Institution, 1978). 
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announced  by President  Carter  focuses  on a wage standard  of 7 percent, 
with price rules based on a mixture  of cost markups  and past pricing 
behavior. 
Union Wages 
In general,  policymakers'  concem about  the labor  market  does not ex- 
tend  equally  to all sectors.  It is widely  believed  that,  in the absence  of legal 
constraints  (such as minimum  wages) or "threat"  effects of potential 
union organization,  nonunion  employers  will make their  wage decisions 
according  to the behavior  of the labor  market.  But it is not clear  that de- 
mand  restraint  would have the same  impact  on the unionized  portion  of 
the labor  market. 
If union wages are at a premium  above what employers  would uni- 
laterally  offer,  union  employers  should  have a queue  of workers  available 
to fill their  vacancies,  even in periods  of high demand.  Thus  the observa- 
tion that the queue is lengthening  should not be of much interest to 
unionized  employers.  Nor should  it be much  of a factor  in the bargaining 
strategy  of the union.2  The demand  for labor  by a specific  bargaining  unit 
is likely to be quite inelastic, especially  in the short run, so that wage 
moderation  would have little influence  in opening  job opportunities  or 
preventing  layoffs.3  In any case, nonunion  unemployed  workers  and even 
union members  who have been laid off probably  will not have a decisive 
voice in the internal  political  structure  of the union. 
The collective  bargaining  sector also is characterized  by institutional 
features  that are much  less common  among  nonunion  employers.  Union 
contracts  typically  specify a fixed duration  of two to three  years.4  Thus 
2.  However, the  business cycle  could  have indirect effects on  the  ability of 
strikers or their family members to obtain secondary incomes, on the employer's 
ability to pay, and on strike costs to the employer. For a more detailed discussion  of 
this point, see Daniel J. B. Mitchell, "Union Wage Policies: The Ross-Dunlop De- 
bate Reopened,"  Industrial  Relations, vol. 11 (February 1972), pp. 46-61. 
3. A recent study suggests that the possibilities of factor substitution for union 
production  workers in manufacturing  are relatively limited. See R. B. Freeman and 
J. L. Medoff, "Substitution  between Production  Labor and other Inputs in Unionized 
and Non-Unionized Manufacturing,"  discussion paper 581  (Harvard University, 
Harvard  Institute  of Economic Research,  October 1977). 
4.  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Characteristics  of Major Collective Bargain- 
ing Agreements,  July 1, 1975, bulletin 1957 (Government  Printing  Office, 1977), pp. 
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decisions  made  in the past are at any point  in time a substantial  determi- 
nant  of wage  trends  in the union  sector.  In 1977, a heavy  bargaining  year, 
only 40 percent  of the workers  in the major  union sector (agreements 
covering  1,000 or more  workers) received  wage adjustments  due to cur- 
rent settlements.  Most of the remainder  received  adjustments  from con- 
tracts  adopted  before 1977.S 
Cost-of-living  escalator  clauses  are another  special  feature  of the labor 
market  that appear  mainly  in union wage agreements.  Of the 9.7 million 
workers  estimated  to take part in major  union agreements  in the private 
sector, 5.8 million were covered by escalators  in 1978. An additional 
900,000 union workers  participating  in smaller agreements  were also 
subject  to escalation.6  The major  union sector  represents  roughly  half of 
the private  union  work  force. Thus  it is evident  that escalator  clauses  are 
concentrated  in the larger  contracts.  For example,  all the so-called key 
contracts  to be negotiated  in 1979-trucking,  rubber,  electrical  equip- 
ment, meat packing,  and automobiles-currently  include some form of 
an escalator  clause. The only component  of the major  union sector in 
which escalation is generally  absent is construction.  There, the strong 
need of employers  to know their  labor costs in advance  for bidding  pur- 
poses drastically  limits the proportion  of workers  with escalators. 
Since the mid-1950s, the proportion  of the labor  force reported  to be 
unionized  has been shrinking.  Measured  against  the total labor  force, the 
proportion  has fallen from  over 25 percent  at the end of the Korean  War 
to 21.7 percent  in 1974, the latest  year  for which  estimates  are available.7 
The figure  would be higher  if employee  associations  (organizations  that 
dislike the label "union"  but often engage  in collective  bargaining)  and 
certain other groups were included. Employee associations  are found 
mainly in goverument.  In 1974, about 28 percent of wage and salary 
workers  in the private nonfarm  sector were members  of some sort of 
organization  representing  employees.  And because  union  workers  tend  to 
S. Judith A. Finger, "Wage-rate  Increases in Major Agreements in 1977 Smaller 
than Any Year Since 1973," Current Wage Developments, vol. 30 (April 1978), p. 
53. 
6.  Douglas R. LeRoy, "Scheduled  Wage Increases and Escalator Provisions in 
1978," Monthly Labor Review, vol.  101 (January 1978), pp. 3-8. 
7.  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National Unions and Employee 
Associations, 1975, bulletin 1937 (GPO,  1977),  p. 63; and U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Handbook of  Labor Statistics 1975-Reference  Edition, bulletin 1865 
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earn more than nonunion  workers,  the union wage bill may account  for 
about  35 percent  of the total wage  bill for the private  nonfarm  sector.8 
It has been widely  held that  union  wage decisions  "spill  over"  into the 
nonunion  sector, causing  that sector to follow the collective  bargaining 
pattern.9  Anecdotal evidence is easy to find concerning  particular  em- 
ployers  who automatically  extend  the union wage to their  nonunion  em- 
ployees.  But situations  also exist in which  nonunion  wage decisions  seem 
to "spill  over"  into the union  sector.  And some  recent  empirical  work  has 
tended  to play down the importance  of the spillover  effect  from  union  to 
nonunion.10 
Even if an agnostic  view of the magnitude  of the union's  ripple  effect 
were  taken,  it would  be difficult  to imagine  plausible  theories  in which  the 
influence  of increases  in union  wages  on inflation  is negative."'  Moreover, 
the inclusion  in the union  sector  of large  numbers  of workers  in individual 
situations  makes it an inviting  target  for federal policymakers  who are 
anxious to obtain a foothold somewhere  in the wage-price  spiral. This 
article  sheds  some  light on a number  of special  features  of the determina- 
8. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that there were 23,408,000 members 
of unions (including locals affiliated directly with the AFL-CIO, local unaffiliated 
unions, and single-firm  unions) and associations in 1974. If government and farm 
memberships  are excluded, the estimate falls to 18,027,000, which is 28 percent of 
payroll employment for the private nonfarm sector. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Sta- 
tistics, Directory, pp. 63, 71, and Economic Report of the President, January 1978, 
p. 296. The 35 percent estimate is the weight of unionized workers in the employ- 
ment cost index in December 1977. 
9.  See the remarks of John T. Dunlop in a recent debate on the utility of re- 
search in labor economics in which he argues that policymakers  must take account 
of the spread of major union pattern-setting  settlements.  He argues that these settle- 
ments spread  out to other union workers  and indirectly  to technical, managerial,  and 
clerical employees by means of local salary surveys and internal company compen- 
sation plans. See John T. Dunlop, "Reply,"  Industrial  and Labor Relations Review, 
vol. 31  (October 1977), p. 15. A recent report of the Council on Wage and Price 
Stability presents an equation "based on the premise that nonunion wages are a 
function of the unemployment  rate and union wage increases."  See U.S. Council on 
Wage and Price Stability, A Quarterly Report of  the Council on Wage and Price 
Stability with a Special Report on Inflation, report 13 (GPO, 1978), pp. 45-46. 
10. Robert Flanagan, "Wage Interdependence in  Unionized Labor Markets," 
BPEA, 3:1976, pp. 635-73; and George E. Johnson, 'The Determination  of Wages 
in the Union and Non-union Sectors,"  British  Journal  of Industrial  Relations, vol. 15 
(July 1977), pp. 211-25. 
11. One might argue that increases in union wages displace employment from 
the union to the nonunion sector, causing a nonunion deflationary  effect. However, 
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tdon  of union wages and their policy implications,  based on previously 
underutilized  data sources.  The paper  concludes  with an analysis  of the 
outlook for the 1979 bargaining  season and the new guidelines  program. 
WAGB  EQUATIONS 
Much of the research  on wage  equations  has been aimed  at improving 
the explanatory  variables  in aggregative  equations.  It is obviously  impor- 
tant to identify  the key independent  variables  in the wage-determination 
process.  However,  there  is little in economic  theory  to guide  the wage  re- 
searcher  beyond the general  proposition  that some measure  of inflation 
and of real business  conditions  ought to be included.  Modem computer 
technology  makes  the search  for equations  with better  fit too easy. 
An alternative  approach  is to limit the independent  variables  to some 
straightforward  proxies  for inflation  and business  conditions  and to dis- 
aggregate  the wage series in ways that follow labor-market  institutions. 
The loss in elegance  may  well be balanced  by a gain  in insight.  However, 
the difficulty  in the disaggregated  approach  is finding  data sources that 
follow institutional  forms.  In particular,  it is desirable  to distinguish  be- 
tween  wage adjustments  in union  and  in nonunion  situations.  And within 
the union sector, it would be convenient  to distinguish  between wage 
adjustments  that reflect contemporary  decisions (new contract nego- 
tiations) and those that result  from earlier  decisions  (deferred  and esca- 
lator adjustments  near the end of the contract's  duration).  It is obvious, 
for example,  that the second and third  year of a nonescalated  contract 
cannot be influenced by unanticipated  changes in economic circum- 
stances,  except  in the special  case in which  both parties  agree  to abandon 
the specified  terms  of the agreement.  Wage  adjustments  in the second  and 
third  years  of an escalated  contract  are  mechanically  influenced  by move- 
ments  in the consumer  price  index (CPI), but by no other  unanticipated 
contemporary  variables. 
Two data sources  are used in this article  to capture  these institutional 
features  in the labor market.  The first is a measure  of changes  in wage 
rates  for manufacturing  prepared  by the U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics, 
which  can be significantly  disaggregated  to provide  indexes  of wage  move- 
ments  for union and nonunion  establishments  and for new and deferred 
wage  changes.  The second  is a file of agreements  of large  union  situations 
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mining,  and transportation  industries.  It is unfortunate  that neither  data 
set includes  adjustments  for fringe  benefits,  an important  element  of union 
compensation. 
Wage  Changes  in Manufacturing 
Since  1959, the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  has  published  data  on manu- 
facturing  establishments  that  make  general  wage  adjustments.12  The series 
measures  median changes  in wage rates for production  workers  in the 
union and nonunion sectors. Wage changes are given as "effective" 
changes (resulting  from first-year,  deferred,  and escalator  adjustments) 
and as first-year  adjustments  alone.  A separate  tabulation  is provided  for 
the major  union sector, which also lists effective and first-year  adjust- 
ments.  Most nonunion  adjustments  are essentially  first-year  changes  be- 
cause  nonunion  employers  are  unlikely  to make  long-term  unilateral  com- 
mitments.  Thus only the effective changes  for the nonunion  sector are 
considered  here.'3 
The BLS provides  data on both the number  of workers  covered by 
first-year  changes  and  those  protected  by effective  changes.  This  informa- 
tion  is used  to estimate  additional  wage  changes  for deferred  and  escalator 
adjustments  in the major  union  sector  and  for first-year  and deferred  ad- 
justments  in the "minor"  (nonmajor) union sector (workers  in union 
establishments  not covered  by agreements  involving  1,000 or more  work- 
ers). However,  these estimates  are imprecise  for two reasons.  First, for 
the years  in which the mean data are available,  the means and medians 
are not identical,  although  they are closely associated.  As an example, 
during  the limited  period  when both the mean  and the median  data  were 
available  for the major  union sector, the medians  understated  the mean 
first-year  adjustments  by an average  of about 0.6 percentage  point and 
effective  changes  by less than 0.4 percentage  point. Thus if the medians 
are  used as if they  were  means  to predict  deferred  adjustments  from  first- 
year  and  effective  changes,  estimated  deferred  adjustments  will be slightly 
overstated. 
Second,  workers  who receive  first-year  increases  may also receive  de- 
12. The data appear in Current Wage Developments, various issues. 
13. Effective  and first-year  nonunion  median  wage changes  rarely  deviate  by 
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cause it adjusts  for changes  in the composition  of the labor force that 
have affected  the relationship  between  observed  unemployment  and the 
"looseness"  or "tightness"  of the labor market.  However,  the two rates 
are highly intercorrelated  (R  =  0.9)  over the observation  period, and 
the autoregressive  correction  used  in the estimation  of the equations  tends 
to eliminate  the impact  of the trend divergence  of those rates. In addi- 
tion, the rates  have different  average  levels, and therefore  produce  coeffi- 
cients of  U-1 of different  magnitudes.  This makes the equations  using 
weighted  unemployment  somewhat  cumbersome  if a translation  in terms 
of the official  rate  is desired  for policy  purposes.  For this reason,  only the 
equations  using  the official  unemployment  rate  are discussed."7 
Various  lag structures  were  used for the price  and  unemployment  vari- 
ables. As noted above, escalator  coverage  is concentrated  in the larger 
contracts.  Hence signs  of escalator  influence  should  be expected  in equa- 
tions based on the series of deferred adjustments  in the major union 
sector. 
STATISTICAL  ESTIMATES 
Table 1 provides  a summary  of the regression  results.  The nonunion 
sector in row 5 of the table exhibits  the expected  sensitivity  to real busi- 
ness conditions.  At 6 percent  official  unemployment,  row 5 suggests  that 
increases  in the nonunion  wage rate would be slowed  by 0.4 percentage 
point if there were a 1 percentage  point increase  in the unemployment 
rate. The coefficient  for p-1 indicates  that a 1 percentage  point rise in 
price  inflation  translates  into an increase  of roughly  0.6 percentage  point 
in nonunion  wage  inflation. 
17. The use of the unemployment  rate is simply  intended  as a proxy  for real 
business conditions. Other indicators were tested with similar results: the quit rate 
in manufacturing,  the inverse of the unemployment rate for white males aged 35- 
44, and the ratio of real gross national product to its logarithmic  trend. Experiments 
inserting the year-to-year change in the unemployment rate generally produced in- 
significant coefficients. When a lagged variable representing  the ratio of profits to 
sales was added to the equations,  it usually produced  negative coefficients.  This result 
is understandable  because wage increases are a potential subtraction from profits 
and because changes in both profits  and wages are highly correlated  with their lagged 
values. It is possible that profits, when viewed as an index of ability to pay, do in- 
fluence wage movements, but that simple equations do not pick up the effect. Experi- 
ments suggested by some Brookings panel members using lagged changes in money 
supply rather than in prices generally produced insignificant  coefficients of money 
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ferred  increases  in the same  year.  A worker  who received  a first-year  ad- 
justment  under  a new contract  on, say, July 1, 1970, might  also have re- 
ceived a deferred  or escalator  adjustment  on January  1, 1970, under  the 
previous  expiring  contract.  The worker  might also receive an escalator 
adjustment  on December  31, 1970, under  the new contract.  Thus if the 
number  of workers  receiving  deferred  and  escalator  adjustments  is calcu- 
lated by subtracting  the number  receiving  first-year  adjustments  from 
those receiving  effective adjustments,  the deferred  and escalator  popu- 
lation  will be understated.  As a result,  the estimated  deferred  and escala- 
tor increase  will be overstated,  especially  during  periods  when escalator 
increases  are high.14 
Despite  these difficulties,  it seems  reasonable  to estimate  the unknown 
components  of union  wages  with  the available  data,  and then  to interpret 
the results  with  the data  limitations  in mind.  At least  some  potential  prob- 
lems can be alleviated  by reference  to the data on a sample  of contracts 
discussed  in the next section.  Six data  series  were  taken  or estimated  from 
the BLS manufacturing  data: first-year  adjustments  (excluding  escalator 
adjustments)  in the major union sector; first-year  adjustments  in the 
minor union sector; deferred  and escalator  adjustments  (hereafter  de- 
noted "deferred")  in the major  union sector;  deferred  adjustments  in the 
minor  union  sector;  nonunion  effective  wage changes;  and effective  wage 
changes  for  the combined  union  and  nonunion  sectors.15 
Wage  changes  for 1960-76 were  regressed  in annual  equations  against 
the year-to-year  percent  changes  in the CPI (p)  and the inverse  of the 
unemployment  rate (U-1). Two forms of the unemployment  rate were 
tested: the official  rate and the weighted  Perry  rate.1'  The weighted  un- 
employment  rate is a conceptual  improvement  over the official  rate be- 
14. This problem is distinct from the one to be discussed  below in which deferred 
adjustments  in escalated contracts  from the union contract data are underestimated. 
15. Data were available directly for effective and first-year  adjustments  (includ- 
ing zero and negative adjustments) for major  union situations  and all union  situations. 
Using employment  weights, the implicit minor first-year  adjustments  were calculated. 
Available data on effective wage adjustments  for major  union situations  and on first- 
year adjustments  were used to calculate the implicit deferred adjustment  for major 
unions (including escalator adjustments). Existing data on effective adjustments  and 
first-year  adjustments  for all union situations were used to calculate effective minor 
union adjustments,  and these were combined with the estimates of minor first-year 
adjustments  to calculate the implicit minor deferred adjustments. 
16. For a  description of  the Perry unemployment rate, see George L. Perry, 
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The most interesting  results in the table relate to the union sector. 
First-year  adjustments  in both the major and minor components  show 
roughly  the same sensitivity  to unemployment  as the nonon  sector. 
One appealing  interpretation  of this finding  is that the initial  increase  in 
long-term  agreements  reflects  real  business  conditions  at the time  of nego- 
tiations. However, the following section presents  evidence that the ap- 
parent  sensitivity  does not derive  from long-term  agreements,  but rather 
from short-term  agreements  in which  the first-year  increment  constitutes 
most or all of the wage change  for the entire  life of the contract.  Never- 
theless, the concentration  of  unemployment  sensitivity in short-term 
agreements  does not necessarily  mean  that  participants  in long-term  con- 
tracts  are  insensitive.  In some cases they  may  react  to aberrations  in what 
they perceive  as temporary  economic  circumstances  by adopting  a short- 
term (temporary)  agreement,  presumably  to be followed  by a long-term 
agreement  when  the economic  climate  changes. 
Both the major and minor sectors show sensitivity  to lagged price 
change,  p.1, although  the coefficient  for the major  union sector  is larger 
than  the coefficient  for the minor  union and  nonunion  sectors  and  is close 
to unity.  Given  the crudeness  of the data  and  equations,  there  seems  little 
difference,  however, between the short-term  pattern  in nonunion and 
first-year  union  wage adjustments. 
It is in the deferred  component  of the union  sector  that  important  dif- 
ferences  between  the union and nonunion  sector  can be seen. Before  ex- 
ploring  these, it is essential  to note that estimates  of the deferred  wage 
adjustment  are dominated  by past wage decisions, including  previous 
decisions to use contingency  arrangements.  Because on average  union 
contracts  are  effective  for two to three  years,  variables  used  to explain  de- 
ferred adjustments  must be lagged. The equations  in the table assume 
that the appropriate  lag is two years.  Exceptions  must  be made,  however, 
for escalator  contingency  clauses  associated  with the CPI. For contracts 
with such clauses,  the current  rate of price  change (p0) is clearly  neces- 
sary  for explanatory  purposes. 
The major  union sector is associated  with cost-of-living  escalation.  It 
is not surprising  then that contemporary  price inflation  occurs as a sig- 
nificant  explanatory  variable  in row 3. (The magnitude  of the coefficient 
is discussed  below.) Escalation  is much  less frequent  in the minor  union 
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much  influence  on the deferred  portion  of the contract.  And, indeed,  the 
coefficient  of p0  in row 4 is essentially  zero. Apart  from escalator  effects, 
deferred  wage  changes  might  reflect  price  inflation  at roughly  the original 
contract  negotiation  date,  that  is, p2. The minor  union  sector,  where  esca- 
lation is less common,  in fact does exhibit  a significant  coefficient  for p.4 
with  a magnitude  approximately  equal  to the coefficient  for p-, in the first- 
year equation.  Row 4 seems  to imply  that  wages  in the nonescalated  sec- 
tor  in all years  of the contract  react  similarly  to the price  inflation  that  had 
occurred  when the agreement  was signed.  One interpretation  is that non- 
escalated contracts  carry inflation  assumptions  from the past into the 
future.  Another  is that they catch up with price inflation  gradually.  The 
escalated  major  union  sector  shows  virtually  no sensitivity  to lagged  infla- 
tion in the deferred  element of the contract.  Negotiators  evidently  are 
willing  to rely mainly  upon escalators  to handle  future  inflation. 
What  is puzzling  about  the major  union  sector's  deferred  performance 
is the magnitude  of the coefficient  of p0. The unitary  coefficient  is larger 
than studies  of actual  union escalator  clauses suggest  it should be. One 
study,  for example,  found that escalators  typically  provided  a 0.57 per- 
cent wage increase  for each 1 percent  of CPI inflation."8  This less-than- 
proportional  relationship  is the result of the formulas  that are applied 
and  the special  limitations  placed  on the actual  operation  of the formulas. 
A common  escalator  formula  at present  is 1 cent an hour  for each 0.3 
index-point  increase  in the CPI (1967 =  100). In June 1978, the CPI  for 
urban  wage and clerical  workers  was 195.3. A 0.3 point increase  there- 
fore translates  into a 0.15 percent  price increase.  Thus at a wage level 
of about $6.50 an hour  the formula  would  just compensate  for inflation, 
but many  union  workers  earn  more  than this amount.  In addition,  "cor- 
ridors"  and  limitations  on the absolute  amount  of escalator  payoff  require 
some inflation  to occur before  payoff  begins;  such features  move escala- 
tors  further  from  proportionality.  From  a bargaining  viewpoint,  escalators 
add uncertainty  to the costs of employers  who may  need accurate  projec- 
tions  of future  nominal  costs  for bidding  and  planning.  Moreover,  escala- 
tors may  be designed  to obscure  their  limitations  from  union  membership 
(for example,  by shifting  from  index  points to percentage  points  without 
18. See Victor J. Sheifer, "Collective Bargaining and the CPI: Escalation vs. 
Catch-Up,"  in Industrial  Relations Research Association Series, Proceedings  of the 
August 1978 Meeting (forthcoming). 548  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
changing  the cent-per-hour  payoff).  19  In short,  the escalator  formulas  re- 
flect  bargaining  compromises. 
The issue remains  of why the estimated  coefficient  of p0  in row 3 is so 
large. Its magnitude  appears  to stem primarily  from the method  of esti- 
mation  of deferred  wage  adjustments  rather  than  from  any  structural  rela- 
tionship.  It was noted above that the deferred  wage estimate  tends  to be 
relatively  overstated  in periods when escalators  take on importance  in 
the total deferred  wage  adjustment.  This  effect  occurs  because  the  number 
of workers  receiving  such  increases  will be more  understated  during  these 
periods.  Escalators  do become  more  important  if many  workers  are cov- 
ered  by escalators  and  if escalators  pay large  amounts.  Both  these  circum- 
stances tend to arise during  periods of rapid inflation.  And this effect 
tends to bias the coefficient  upward.  If the period 1973-76 is dropped 
from the equation  in row 3, for example,  the coefficient  falls to 0.51.20 
The reaction  of deferred  wage  changes  to lagged  unemployment  (U-2)- 
that is, to unemployment  at the time of negotiations-raises  some  interest- 
ing issues. In the minor  union sector, the unemployment  coefficient  has 
the right  sign and is significant.  But it is much  smaller  than  for first-year 
changes.  If the coefficient  for the life-of-contract  wage change  of a two- 
year agreement  in the minor  union sector consists of an average  of the 
first-year  and deferred  reaction  coefficients  (in this case, 10.5), a 1 per- 
centage  point  increase  in the official  unemployment  rate  from  a 6 percent 
level would  cut the life-of-contract  wage  increase  by only one-fourth  of 1 
percent.  The reaction  would be even smaller  in a three-year  contract. 
For the major  union  sector,  the deferred  unemployment  coefficient  ex- 
hibits the "wrong"  sign (table 1, row 3)  and, taken  literally,  would out- 
weigh the first-year  coefficient  in a contract  of two or three years'  dura- 
19. The most creative escalator of the past few years appears is the 1976 con- 
tracts of General Electric Company. Wages were to rise 1 cent an hour for each 0.3 
percent (not each index point)  increase in the CPI up to 7 percent and above 9 
percent with no credit for the gap between 7 and 9 percent. See "Wage  Highlights," 
Current  Wage  Developments, vol. 28 (July 1976), p. 1. 
20. The estimated  equation  is: 
MDEF =  3.73 +  0.51po  +  0.36p_s  -  12.55U4l, 
Durbin-Watson -  2.27; A2 -  0.81; standard error =  0.43; p(l)  =  0.07; p(2)  -  -0.01, 
where MDEF is estimated deferred adjustments  in the major union sector. The con- 
stant and first two coefficients are significant at a level of  5 percent or more. The 
lagged price coefficient  increases  in magnitude  and significance,  presumably  because 
the major union sector had less escalation in the earlier period. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  549 
tion. The perverse  reaction  to unemployment  appears  again  to be due to 
the method of calculating  deferred  increases.  Beginning  in 1973, esti- 
mated deferred  increases  become quite  large,  while at the same time un- 
employment  rises. Escalator clauses, mirroring  the inflation  in prices, 
would have substantially  raised the deferred  component  of the major 
union  sector.  But as noted,  the method  of calculation  tends  to exaggerate 
deferred  wage increases  as escalators  become more significant.  And this 
exaggeration  coincides with a period of high unemployment.  Omitting 
the 1973-76 period  reduces  both the mapitude and significance  of the 
unemployment  coefficient.21 
If the coefficient  of U:4 in row 3 were  zero,  the impact  of unemploy- 
ment  on the wage change  over the life of the contract  would  still be quite 
small-roughly comparable  to the life-of-contract  estimate  for the minor 
union sector.  In any given  year, substantial  numbers  of major  and minor 
union workers  would  receive  only deferred  adjustments,  which  could not 
react  to current  unemployment  and apparently  do not reflect  past unem- 
ployment.  This result  is in sharp  contrast  to the nonunion  sector  in which 
the option  to change  wages  in response  to current  circumstances  is always 
available. 
A final point on the wage equations  for manufacturing  is worth  men- 
tion. Row 6 of table 1 presents  an aggregate  equation  that offers  an ex- 
planation  of the effective  wage changes  in manufacturing.  The dependent 
variable  includes  both union  and  nonunion  sectors;  the union  sector  com- 
prises  first-year  and  deferred  adjustments.  The result  of using  an equation 
in aggregate  form  is a regression  with an implausibly  low (and barely  sig- 
nificant) price  coefficient;  such a regression  depends  largely  on the auto- 
regressive  properties  of wage data for its explanatory  power.  It appears, 
therefore,  that  aggregate  equations  which  take  no account  of labor-market 
institutions  are likely to miss important  elements  of the wage-determina- 
tion process. 
Evidence  from  Union  Contract  Data 
In recent  years  a number  of empirical  studies  of union  wage  determina- 
tion have  been conducted,  based  on observations  of samples  of individual 
21. The coefficient  of U:J  in the equation  of note 20 falls just below significance  at 
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agreements  rather  than on general  wage indexes." The use of contract 
data  has many  advantages.  These  data  permit  explicit  division  of the sam- 
ple into long-term,  short-term,  escalated,  and nonescalated  agreements. 
Even the wage data presented  in the previous  section could not directly 
be disaggregated  at such a level of detail. Knowledge  of the timing  of 
negotiations  permits the design of  explanatory  variables to be more 
closely  related  to this  fiming. 
Contract  data are not easy to obtain.  Although  the BLS maintains  a 
file of contracts  for its own costing  purposes,  the cost information  con- 
tained  therein  is confidential  and is not available  to the public  for indi- 
vidual agreements.  However, the BLS does make available a  wage 
chronology  for each of a number  of important  collective  bargaining  situa- 
tions. In addition,  its periodical,  Current  Wage  Developments,  provides 
data on reported  wage  increases  in individual  union  situations.  These  two 
sources, however, most frequently  report wage increments  in terms of 
cents  per hour.  The information  on fringe  benefits  does not allow costing 
of the benefits.  And although  the chronologies  provide  information  on 
some occupational  categories,  there  are no data available  on the average 
base  wage  prior  to the start  of the contract. 
Despite this lack of precise  information,  the advantages  of using con- 
tracts  rather  than time periods  as observations  suggest  that estimates  of 
the wage costs are worth  the effort,  partly  as a check against  the results 
obtained  in the previous  section. Consequently,  estimates  were made of 
the wage-rate  increments  in 172 union contracts  negotiated  by 17 major 
employers  or employer  associations  during  1954-76, primarily  from in- 
formation  contained  in the wage  chronologies.  Contracts  included  manu- 
facturing,  mining, and transportation  situations  and are listed in table 
A-I in the appendix. 
22.  See  Daniel  S.  Hamermesh, 'Wage  Bargains, Threshold Effects, and the 
Phillips Curve," Quarterly  Journal of Economics, vol. 84 (August 1970), pp. 501- 
17; Daniel S. Hamermesh,  "Market  Power and Wage Inflation,"  Southern  Economic 
Journal, vol.  39  (October 1972),  pp. 204-12;  Gordon R. Sparks and David A. 
Wilton, "Determinants of  Negotiated Wage Increases: An  Empirical Analysis," 
Econometrica, vol.  39  (September 1971),  pp. 739-50;  and L. N.  Christofides,  R. 
Swidinsky, and D.  A.  Wilton, "A Micro Econometric Analysis of  the Canadian 
Wage Determination  Process (1966-75)"  (University of Guelph, April 1978). Con- 
tract data have  also  been used to  analyze nonwage outcomes. See Thomas A. 
Kochan and Richard  N. Block, "An Interindustry  Analysis of Bargaining  Outcomes: 
Preliminary  Evidence from Two-Digit Industries,"  Quarterly  Journal of Economics, 
vol. 91 (August 1977), pp. 431-52. Daniel  J. B. Mitchell  551 
Three  measures  of wage  change  were  computed  and  converted  into an- 
nualized  percentage  rates,  based  on average  hourly  earings for the rele- 
vant industry  classification.  FIRST is used to indicate  percentage  change 
in wage rates scheduled  as general  adjustments  of wages  during  the first 
twelve  months  of the contract.  These  estimates  generally  exclude  both  "in- 
equity"  adjustments  made to particular  subgroups  of workers  and esca- 
lator  increases.  LIFE denotes  annualized  percentage  change  from  general 
adjustments  of wages and escalator  payments  over the entire  life of the 
contract.  Inequity  adjustments  are generally  excluded. 
DEFERRED is annualized  percentage  change from general adjust- 
ments  of wages and escalator  payments  over the life of the contract,  ex- 
cluding  the increments  reported  in FIRST. Because escalator  payments 
often occur during  the first year, the annualization  period for escalated 
contracts  is the full life of the contract.  For nonescalated  contracts,  the 
annualization  period  is the life of the contract  minus  twelve  months.  DE- 
FERRED was not computed  for contracts  of less than eighteen  months 
(none of which  were  escalated  in the sample).28 
23.  In the previous section a problem of  estimating deferred adjustments  was 
noted concerning  inaccurate  estimates of the number  of workers  affected.  In this sec- 
tion, a different  problem  arises because escalator clauses may activate during  the first 
twelve months of the contract. For nonescalated contracts the deferred portion of 
the contract should be annualized over the contract duration minus twelve months. 
Because escalators can be effective in the first year, the deferred  portion of escalated 
contracts must be annualized over the full contract. This procedure  understates  the 
percentage rate of change of the deferred component of an escalated contract rela- 
tive to  that of  a  nonescalated contract. Imagine two agreements of  twenty-four 
months, one escalated and the other nonescalated. Suppose both called for semi- 
annual adjustments  beginning with the first day of the contract, and suppose further 
that both increased wages by  3 percent every six months. But suppose that the 
escalated contract called for 1 percent  fixed increase each six months and the remain- 
ing 2 percent came from the escalator. Both would have a value of LIFE =  6.1 per- 
cent. The escalated contract would have a value of FIRST = 2.0 percent because no 
escalator increases are assigned to FIRST, while the nonescalated contract would 
show FIRST =  6.1 percent. The escalated contract would provide for deferred in- 
creases of 2 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, and 3 percent over twenty-four months. 
This would produce a value of DEFERRED =  5.1 percent. For the nonescalated 
contract, the final two increases of 3 percent would be spread over twelve months, 
producing a value of DEFERRED =  6.1 percent. In short, due to the treatment  of 
the escalator increase, a first-year  increase of 2.0 percent and a deferred increase of 
5.1 percent would be associated  with a life-of-contract  annualized increase  averaging 
6.1 percent. The alternative procedure of  annualizing the deferred component of 
the escalated contract over only the last twelve months of the contract would over- 
state the rate of increase during that period. Another possibility would be simply to 552  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
In addition  to the data  on general  adjustments  of wages,  the  wage  chro- 
nologies  provide  some  information  on wage  rates  paid  to specific  occupa- 
tional groups. It is possible that, because of special "inequity"  adjust- 
ments, over time certain  groups  of workers  experience  different  rates of 
percentage  wage changes.  An interesting  question  is whether  the forces 
that explain  general  changes  in wages  have a systematic  effect  on relative 
wages  by skill class.  A narrowing  of skill  differentials,  for example,  might 
give rise to dissatisfaction  among  some workers,  an ongoing  problem  in 
certain industrial  unions. Such dissent can complicate the bargaining 
process  and  hinder  contract  ratification,  as it did at the Ford  Motor  Com- 
pany mn  1973.2" 
To address  the issue of wage structure,  three additional  measures  of 
wage  change  were  computed  for contracts  having  the necessary  data  avail- 
able. An annualized  percentage  increase  in wage  rates  over the life of the 
contract  is denoted  LOW for an occupation  at the bottom of the wage 
structure  (for example,  a position  corresponding  to janitor); MEDIUM 
for an occupation  in the middle  of the wage structure;  and  HIGH for an 
occupation  toward  the top of the wage  structure. 
Four  independent  variables  were  initially  used  to explain  wage  changes 
according  to these  various  measures  for all contracts  with durations  of at 
least eleven  months.25  Three  of these correspond  to the variables  used in 
the previous  section. These are  p-1, the year-to-year  percentage  increase 
in the CPI lagged  one year  before  the effective  date of the contract;  Uo1, 
the inverse of the official  unemployment  rate in the year the contract 
became  effective;  and COLA, the annualized  percentage  rate of change 
of the CPI over the life of the contract  if the contract  has an escalator  or 
allocate escalated increments  during the first  year to FIRST, although this procedure 
differs from the methodology used by the BLS in preparing  the manufacturing  esti- 
mates that appear in table 1. The problem occurring in the estimation of FIRST is 
minimized because escalated contracts often include a fixed rather than an escalator 
adjustment  as a large fraction of their first-year  adjustments.  The problem  disappears 
when LIFE is used as the dependent  variable. 
24.  A number of industrial  unions have had skilled trades problems. For back- 
ground, see Arnold R. Weber, "The Craft-Industrial  Issue Revisited: A Study of 
Union Government,"  Industrial  and Labor Relations Review, vol. 16 (April 1963), 
pp. 381-404.  The issue at Ford in  1973 involved voluntary overtime rather than 
wage differentials per se. During the  1960s, the National Labor Relations Board 
tightened its criteria used in considering craft petitions for severance from existing 
industrial units, thus lessening the pressure on unions to deal with the concerns of 
skilled trades. 
25.  Agreements of  less than eleven months were excluded because they often 
represented  interim adjustments  granted  while negotiations  progressed. Daniel  J. B. Mitchell  553 
zero  if it has no escalator.  A fourth  variable,  REL, is an index  of the rela- 
tive wage status  of a particular  industry  prior  to the effective  date of the 
contract.26 
The use of the first  three variables  is straightforward  and requires  no 
justification.  However,  the REL variable  had no counterpart  in the pre- 
vious section and requires  discussion. Some of the literature  on wage 
determination  suggests  that wages in different  industries  are linked to- 
gether.  Wide-reaching  patterns  are occasionally  said  to tie settlements  to- 
gether.27  Often  one finds  references  to "catch-up"  pressure  affecting  wage 
settlements,  although  it is not always  clear  whether  the catch-up  involved 
is relative  to prices  or wages.28  And generally  it might  be argued  that in- 
terindustry  wage differentials  are limited  in the degree  to which  they can 
vary  by the potential  for substitution  in both product  and labor  markets. 
Any or all of these considerations  would lead to the expectation  that 
a group  of workers  that had fallen "behind"  its "normal"  standing  in the 
interindustry  wage structure  would speed  up its rate  of wage  increase,  all 
other  things  being  equal.  Similarly,  a group  that  was "ahead"  would  slow 
down.2'l  Thus a negative  coefficient  of REL is expected.  It would simply 
26. As in the previous  section, estimates  of the equations  were calculated  with both 
the official  rate of unemployment,  Uc  1, and the Perry  weighted  rate of unemployment. 
Again, the two rates  are highly  correlated  so that  virtually  the same  results  were  obtained 
for both. The equations  below use the official  rate. REL was computed  by dividing  the 
base earnings  (used to compute  percentage  changes  for FIRST,  LIFE,  and DEFERRED) 
by average hourly earnings for the private nonfarm sector in the year prior to  the 
effective  date of the contract,  and then standardizing  the ratio by dividing  it by its mean 
value for all contracts  of the same employer  in the sample. 
27.  Otto Eckstein and Thomas A. Wilson, "The Determination  of Money Wages 
in American Industry,"  Quarterly  Journal of Economics, vol. 76 (August 1962), pp. 
379-414;  John E. Maher, "The Wage Pattern in the United States, 1946-1957," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol.  15 (October 1961), pp. 3-20. 
28.  Marvin Kosters, Kenneth Fedor, and Albert Eckstein, "Collective Bargain- 
ing Settlements  and the Wage Structure,"  Labor  Law Journal,  vol. 24 (August 1973), 
pp. 517-25. 
29.  This hypothesis should be distinguished  from a seemingly related proposition 
that is sometimes found in the literature, which asserts that a "distortion"  of  the 
wage structure leads to  a  generalized increase in  the rate of  wage change. See 
Arnold H. Packer and Seong H. Park, "Distortions in Relative Wages and Shifts 
in the Phillips Curve,"  Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 55 (February 1973), 
pp. 16-22. A second proposition that must be differentiated  is that distortions  in the 
rate of  wage increase generally contribute to  faster wage increases, presumably 
through some sort of competitive, leapfrogging  process. See D. Q. Mills, "Explaining 
Pay  Increases in  Construction: 1953-1972," Industrial Relations, vol.  13  (May 
1974), pp. 196-201. The hypothesis in the text applies only to a particular  unit that 
is out of line from its traditional  position in the wage structure. 554  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
indicate  a tendency  for relative  wage differences  to be maintained.  Such 
a finding  would  not differentiate  between  competing  explanations  for such 
a tendency,  nor would  it preclude  changes  in wage  differentials  across  in- 
dustries  over  long  periods  of time. 
Statistical  Estmtes 
Analysis  of the earlier  regressions  from  the manufacturing  sector  sug- 
gested that wage change  in major  union contracts  would be sensitive  to 
lagged price change.  It also suggested  that sensitivity  to an indicator  of 
business  conditions  such as unemployment  would be found in first-year 
adjustments,  but that this sensitivity  would  not be characteristic  over the 
life of the contract.  Table 2 presents  regression  results  from  the contract 
sample  against  which  the earlier  conclusions  can be checked. 
Equation 1 in the table presents  the overall  results  for FIRST for all 
contracts  in the  sample.  The  coefficients  forp-l and UO'  are  almost  identical 
to those  appearing  in row 1 of table  1. In addition,  table  2 permits  examina- 
tion of the relative  wage  hypothesis,  which  could not be tested  using the 
aggregate  data of table 1. As expected,  REL has a negative  sign and is 
statistically  significant.  Taken literally,  the coefficient  of REL suggests 
that if wages  in a unit were 10  percent  above  normal  prior  to negotiations 
(REL  =  1.10), wages  would  increase  about  two percentage  points  more 
slowly in the first year than they would if relative  wage standing  were 
normal (REL  =  1.00).30 
Table 1 did not provide  a direct  measure  of the LIFE variable.  How- 
ever,  it did suggest  that  the deferred  portion  of the package  was not sensi- 
tive to price change at the time of negotiation  and that the reaction  to 
unemployment  was, if anything,  perverse.  Equation  3 of table 2 suggests 
that, over the life of the contract,  sensitivity  to price change prior to 
negotiation  is a characteristic  of labor contracts  and that sensitivity  to 
30. The  relative wage variable was entered in  the  regressions in ratio form 
rather  than as a wage premium.  That is, an industry  with wages 1 percent above nor- 
mal has REL =  1.01 rather than 0.01. Because REL averages unity in value, it re- 
ceives a large coefficient that is counteracted by a constant term of opposite sign 
and similar absolute magnitude. This in no way changes the interpretation  of the 
REL coefficient as the derivative  of wage change with respect to REL. The effect of 
a  1 percent increase in relative wage status is simply 0.01 times the coefficient of 
REL. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  555 
unemployment  can also be found.  These findings  do not contradict  those 
of table 1. If p,  affects  only the first  year of short-term  contracts,  it will 
still have an influence  on LIFE. (The wage increase  over the life of the 
contract  in agreements  of short  duration  includes  the  first-year  adjustment 
as a major  element.) 
The issue of sensitivity  to unemployment  can be clarified  by explicitly 
dividing the  sample into short-term contracts (eleven to  seventeen 
months) and long-term  contracts  (eighteen  months  or more). Equations 
5 and 7 indicate  that the short-term  contracts  show extremely  high sensi- 
tivity to unemployment.  For example,  equation  7 suggests  that a 1 per- 
centage  point  increase  in the official  unemployment  rate  from  a 6 percent 
level would slow life-of-contract  wage change  by 1.2 percentage  points. 
In contrast,  none of the equations  for long-term  contracts  shows statisti- 
cally significant  wage changes  as a response  to unemployment,  either  in 
the first  year  or in the life of the contract. 
One possible  interpretation  of the apparent  relationship  between  con- 
tract  duration  and unemployment  sensitivity  is that short-term  contracts 
tend to be concentrated  in the earlier  part  of the period.  Of the 61 short- 
term contracts,  47 were negotiated  before 1965. Moreover,  several of 
the later short-term  contracts  resulted  from  interruptions  of contracts  of 
longer duration  that occurred  when the parties  reopened  existing  agree- 
ments.  For whatever  reason,  it appears  that  in the early  part  of the period 
the parties  were  more  likely  to be under  pressure  to adjust  to real  business 
conditions, and that they reacted by using short-term  contracts  as the 
vehicle  for adaptation.8' 
A second possibility  involves running  the causal arrows  in the other 
direction. Long-term contracts represent  a procedure  for minimizing 
transactions  costs. The most obvious  cost that is reduced  is the threat  of 
a strike.  For situations  where  the risks  of being locked into a long-term 
31. Although the short-term contracts in  the sample are concentrated in the 
earlier part of  the period, there is evidence that contract duration is still affected 
by adverse conditions in the unionized labor market. For example, during the last 
few years when American Motors had financial  difficulties,  the United Auto Workers 
granted the company certain concessions in the context of short-term  contracts. In 
September 1978, when the economic outlook for the company brightened,  the parties 
concluded a  two-year agreement that eliminates some of  the concessions of  the 
past. The  wage-price controls initiated in  1971 were apparently viewed by  the 
unionized sector as a temporary change in economic circumstances  and a notable 
shift to shorter-term  contracts occurred. See Weber and Mitchell, The Pay Board's 
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arrangement  in which wages may deviate  from the desired  path are not 
seen as especially  perilous,  the  reduction  of transactions  costs  is attractive. 
Once the decision  is made  to take a long-term  view,  it is natural  to expect 
that wages  would  not reflect  transitory  business  conditions  that  happened 
to exist at the moment  of negotiations.  Instead,  the parties  would  take  an 
averaging  perspective. 
Those whose prior  expectations  call for unitary  price coefficients  will 
get support  from 11 in table 2. In a steady-state  inflation  for escalated 
contracts,  p-1 would be equal to COLA. The coefficients  for these two 
variables  (0.55 and  0.53) sum  approximately  to unity.  In short,  the equa- 
tion suggests  that  economic  units  which  express  an overt  interest  in prices 
by mechanically  tying  their  wages  to the CPI do make  real  wages  immune 
from price inflation.  The units that do not openly express  an interest  in 
pricing (the short-term  and the long-term  nonescalated  contracts)  have 
price coefficients  that fall short  of unity.  Nevertheless,  it might  be argued 
that the tendency  in recent  years  for the spread  of escalation  shows that 
previously  nonescalated  groups are willing to "come out of the closet" 
and expose their  price orientation  to anyone  who cares  to look when in- 
flation  becomes  a sufficient  concern.  That is, they move from  the groups 
represented  by 7 and 20 in which  real  wages  are  vulnerable  to price  infla- 
tion to the group  represented  by equation  I1, in which  they are not. 
Wage  Differentials.  Equations  15, 16, and 17 demonstrate  the impact 
of escalation  on internal  wage differentials.  In long-term  escalated  con- 
tracts,  the coefflicients  of COLA tend to be higher  for low-wage  occupa- 
tions than for high-wage  occupations.  This shows the tendency  of esca- 
lator  formulas  to provide  cents-per-hour  increases  rather  than  percentage 
increases  across  the entire  wage  structure.  Thus  in periods  when  escalator 
increments  are important,  escalators  compress  the wage structure.  This 
tendency  does not necessarily  mean that high-wage  workers  lose in real 
purchasing  power  due to inadequate  escalation  because  nonescalator  in- 
crements  and special  inequity  adjustments  may also be provided.  Taken 
literally,  the sum of the coefficients  of p-, and COLA in 17 suggests  that 
high-wage  workers  are  fully compensated  for steady-state  inflation  by the 
totality  of the wage  package.  (Low- and medium-wage  workers  are  over- 
compensated  if the coefficients  of 15 and 16 are accepted  at face value.) 
But relative  wage compression  could provide  grounds  for dissatisfaction 
and stress  on the union political  structure  and on internal  incentives. 
Table 3 presents  a breakdown  of the 106 contracts  in which all data 
for the LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH variables  were available.  There  is Daniel  J. B. Mitchell  559 
Table  3. Mean  Anize  Rate  of Wage  Increae  at Selected  Wage  Levels,  19S4-76" 
Percent 
Type  of contract 
Variableb  All  Escalated  Nonescalated 
LOW  6.0  7.8  5.2 
MEDIUM  5.6  7.1  4.9 
HIGH  5.4  6.5  4.8 
LIFEO  5.3  6.7  4.7 
Source: See appendix table A-1. 
a.  Includes 35 observations for escalated and 71 for nonescalated, for a total of 106. 
b. The variables are defined in table 2, note b. 
c.  Defined as in table 2, but based on contracts with complete data used to compute LO W, MEDIUM, 
and HIGH categories. 
an apparent tendency for wage differentials to narrow in both escalated 
and nonescalated contracts. (Wages can rise faster for these variables than 
for LIFE due to periodic inequity adjustments.) However, the gap in the 
rate of wage change between high- and low-wage workers is substantially 
larger in the escalated group of contracts than in the nonescalated group. 
Over a ten-year period, the 0.4 percent gap for the nonescalated contracts 
would result in an increase of a little over 4 percent in the ratio between 
low-wage and high-wage workers. The 1.3 percent gap for the escalated 
contracts would result in an increase of 14 percent in the ratio. 
Over the long run, there has been a gradual narrowing of skill differen- 
tials throughout the economy.82 It does  appear, however, that the esca- 
lator mechanism aggravates this trend and that inequity adjustments  given 
to high-wage workers do not fully offset the escalator effect. If inflation 
continues  at a rapid rate, either escalator formulas will be modified to 
provide percentage increases or inequity adjustments for high-wage work- 
ers will become more routine. Some escalator contracts already include 
the former.38  In the short run, however, unrest may result and become yet 
another cost of adapting to an inflationary environment. 
32.  See Harry Ober, "Occupational  Wage Differentials, 1907-1947," Monthly 
Labor Review, vol. 67 (August 1948),  pp. 127-34; and Paul G. Keat, "Long-Run 
Changes in Occupational Wage Structure, 1900-1956," Journal of Political Econ- 
omy, vol. 68 (December 1960), pp. 584-600. 
33. The current major telephone agreement contains an escalator providing a 
combination of  percentage and flat adjustments.  See "Wage Highlights," Current 
Wage Developments, vol.  29  (September 1977),  p.  1. Deere & Company departs 
from the practice of  other farm machinery manufacturers  by using a percentage 
escalator. See "Wage Highlights," Current Wage Developments, vol. 28  (Decem- 
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Mid-1970s.  Table 2 permits  an analysis  of a possible structural  shift 
in wage  determination  in the 1970s. A dummy  variable,  D7376, has been 
added  to some equations;  it is equal  to one for contracts  beginning  in the 
period  1973-76, and zero otherwise.84  The period 1973-76 starts  with a 
remarkable  surge  in food prices  in 1973, which  was reinforced  later  in the 
year by the oil price increases  established  by the Organization  of Petro- 
leum Exporting  Countries.  It includes  actual  shortages  of meat  and  gaso- 
line associated  with price  controls  and the oil embargo  as well as a large 
increase  in the unemployment  rate. Some observers  have associated  the 
period  with a break  in the cyclically  adjusted  trend  rate of productivity 
34. At first glance, it might seem desirable to include a dummy for the impact 
of  the controls program that began in  1971. However, the 1971 contracts in the 
sample were either concluded before controls or based on precontrol  conditions and 
allowed to operate intact by the Pay Board. A number of aerospace contracts were 
reduced, but the effect was simply to delay payment from the first  to the second year 
of the contract. (And even the lost money was eventually restored by a court deci- 
sion.) The longshoremen's  contracts were also cut, but they recovered their money 
when controls expired in 1974. Only two contracts in the sample-both  in textiles- 
were negotiated in 1972 when Phase II controls were fully effective. When a dummy 
for 1972 is added to equations 1 and 3 in table 2, it produces a negative coefficient 
for FIRST (significant  at the 10 percent level)  and a nonsignificant  negative coeffi- 
cient for LIFE. But it may simply be picking up other influences-such  as imports- 
of special importance  to wage setting in the textile industry.  Besides these considera- 
tions, it has been argued  that the purpose  of the controls was not to create subnormal 
wage increases (negative dummy coefficients) but rather to restore wage determina- 
tion to what was considered to be normal at the time. If so, negative coefficients 
should not be expected. See Weber and Mitchell, The Pay Board's Progress, pp. 
306-15. In any case, the onslaught of price increases in early 1973 and the loosen- 
ing of controls in Phases III and IV tended to dissipate the impact of wage controls, 
although as will be noted below, the expiration of controls in April 1974 triggered 
some wage reopenings. 
If 3 is estimated with annual dummies for 1972-76, the foUowing pattern of co- 
efficients  for the dummies is obtained. 
Coefficient  of  Number of 
Year  dummy  observations 
1972  -0.78  2 
1973  2.98  8 
1974  1.86  11 
1975  1.63  2 
1976  0.34  1 
Only the dummies for 1973 and 1974 are statisticaRly  significant.  The lack of sigaifi- 
cance in the later years may be due to the extreme thinness  of the sample after 1974. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  561 
improvement.85  Thus  it is natural  to wonder  if the structure  of union  wage 
determination  might  have been altered  by these  dramatic  events. 
If the structure  of wage determination  was in fact altered  in an infla- 
tionary  direction  during  this period, a further  question  arises.  It is pos- 
sible that the effect  was permanent  so that current  wage  determination  is 
still affected  by a structural  shift  that  occurred  several  years  ago. Another 
possibility,  however,  is that  there  was a temporary  structural  shift  in wage 
determination  during  the mid-1970s, which later disappeared.  Unfortu- 
nately,  because  the contract  data end in the mid-1970s, there  is no way 
of differentiating  between  these alternatives  statistically. 
An additional  consideration  is that the dummy  technique  is crude  and 
raises methodological  problems.  A period such as 1973-76, when ex- 
planatory  variables  take on extreme  values, is of obvious statistical  in- 
terest.  If the underlying  parameters  do not shift during  such periods,  the 
extreme observations  should help establish accurate estimates. When 
dummy  variables  are used to explain such periods,  parameter  estimates 
are  weakened  and  may  be distorted.  However,  the risk  of this  distortion  is 
somewhat  reduced  in a contract  data  base (compared  with  the time-series 
data of the type used for table 1) because  of the large  number  of obser- 
vations. 
On the assumption  that D7376 is not distorting  the estimated  impact 
of the other variables,  the dummy  coefficient  does suggest  that wage in- 
creases  were abnormally  high during  1973-76. Equation  4 suggests  that 
for the overall sample, wage changes averaged  2.4 percentage  points 
above  what  would have been expected  over the life of the contract.  None 
of this effect appeared  to stem from  the first-year  increment. 
An obvious  question  is whether  escalator  increases  were the source  of 
the shift. Although the COLA coefficient  should capture  the escalator 
effect,  it is conceivable  that  escalator  formulas  were  sufficiently  liberalized 
when inflation  became severe to cause an underestimate  of the direct 
impact  of inflation  on escalated  contracts.  The deferred  portion  of esca- 
lated contracts  does show a 1.6 dummy  coefficient,  but not enough  to 
make  the dummy  coefficient  significant  for the life of the contract  (equa- 
tion 12). However,  the dummy  is also positive and significant  (23)  for 
long-term nonescalated  deferred increases, suggesting  that the unex- 
plained  shift  is not merely  an escalator  phenomenon. 
35.  Edward F.  Denison, "Where Has Productivity Gone?" Basis Point, vol. 3, 
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The coefficient  for D7376 is largest  for the life-of-contract  increases 
under short-term  contracts (8).  Seven contracts  within the short-term 
group  began  in the 1973-76 period.  All but one of these was associated 
with scheduled  or unscheduled  reopenings  of existing  agreements  due to 
the sudden  rise in inflation,  the end of controls,  or both. 
The reopener  phenomenon  has three important  effects on the data. 
First, under  the rules adopted  for constructing  the data, a contract  was 
deemed  to end either at its official  expiration  date or at a wage reopen- 
ing, whichever  came  first.  Thus  reopeners  tend  to turn  long-term  contracts 
into short-term  ones, and any structural  shifts  that were associated  with 
reopening  will thereby  tend to be associated  with  the equations  for short- 
term contracts.  Reopeners can also make what were originally  front- 
loaded contracts  (FIRST > LIFE) into de facto back-loaded  contracts 
(FIRST <  LIFE). Consider  a two-year  agreement  negotiated  in 1973 
that  provides  a 5 percent  increase  in the first  year  and  a 4 percent  increase 
in the second year. The annual  rate of increase  over the life of the con- 
tract is about 4.5 percent,  so that the agreement  is front-loaded.  If the 
contract  is interrupted  by a reopener  after  fourteen  months,  the overall 
9.2 percent increase (1.05  x  1.04  =  1.092)  becomes spread over a 
shorter  period  of time than  initially  planned  and  produces  an annual  rate 
of increase  of 7.8 percent.  Because FIRST is now less than LIFE, the 
agreement  has become back-loaded.  Third, although  the timing of the 
reopening  in the example  just described  suggests  a disturbance  that oc- 
cuffed  in 1974, that  disturbance  becomes  associated  with  a 1973 contract. 
Hence the reopener  phenomenon  tends to move the evidence of dis- 
turbance  to a period  prior  to the disturbance. 
None of the interrupted  contracts  was escalated.  The sudden  burst  of 
inflation  had not been fully anticipated  by parties  who presumably  were 
using  p-1  or some related  index as a guide  to the future  rate  of inflation  at 
the time of negotiations.  When  it became evident  that this anticipation 
was invalid,  the contract  was interrupted,  arithmetically  raising  its LIFE 
value and thereby  producing  a significant  and positive dummy coeffi- 
cient.36 
36. The arithmetic explanation in the text is not meant to imply that the wage 
increases recorded  were not "real."  The point is simply that the costing methodology 
caused the real effect to be reflected  in LIFE or DEFERRED estimates rather than 
in the first-year  adjustments,  and that the impact tends to show up in the contract 
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Some  Implications 
Both the union and nonunion  sectors  exhibit  some sensitivity  to busi- 
ness conditions,  as represented  by the unemployment  rate. Even in the 
nonunion  sector, however,  the magnitude  of the sensitivity  is not large. 
Thus the short-run  impact  of recession  on inflation  through  its direct  im- 
pact on the wage-setting  process  is not likely  to be great.  Within  the union 
sector, unemployment  sensitivity  is found mainly in contracts  of short 
duration.  It appears  that,  if sensitivity  is desirable,  the parties  either  nego- 
tiate on a short-term  basis or convert  longer-term  agreements  to shorter 
ones by interrupting  them  with wage  reopeners.  Although  the parties  can 
exercise  discretion  over  contract  duration,  the transactions  costs-includ- 
ing strikes-associated with frequent  negotiations  are a powerful  incen- 
tive for long contracts.  In situations  where transactions  costs make it 
clearly  optimal  to have long-term  contracts,  sensitivity  to short-run  busi- 
ness fluctuations  in the wage-determination  process  cannot  be expected. 
Unionization  tends  to be accompanied  by other industrial  and labor- 
force characteristics  that may have an impact on the wage-determination 
process.  To illustrate  this point, I ran a series of simple  regressions.  The 
annual  (year-to-year)  percent change in average  hourly  earnings  for 93 
selected  industries  was regressed  against  annual  (year-to-year)  change  in 
the CPI lagged  one year  (p-i) and the inverse  of the unemployment  rate 
(U 1)  over  the period  1954-76  or 1959-76,  depending  on data availability. 
A simple  average  of the coefficients  of U 1 over all 93 equations  is 12.0. 
Taken  literally,  this mean  coefficient  suggests  that a 1 percentage  point 
increase  in unemployment  from  a 6 percent  level  would  slow wage  inflation 
by an average  of about 0.3 percentage  point-that  is, wage setting  is not 
very sensitive to short-run  unemployment  changes. Table 4, however, 
shows the mean values  of various  characteristics,  including  unionization, 
for industries  with below-average  and above-average  coefficients  of U '. 
It is apparent  that insensitivity  to business  conditions  is associated  with 
unionization,  fringe  benefits,  larger  establishments,  higher  capital-to-labor 
ratios,  less female  participation  in the work  force, and higher  wages. 
One does not have to be a strict disciple of the dual labor market 
school of analysis  to offer plausible  explanations  of why these charac- 
teristics  might  diminish  wage  sensitivity  to unemployment.87  Unionization 
37.  For a discussion of the dual labor market approach, see Peter B. Doeringer 
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Table  4. Selected  Characteritics  of Industries,  by Sensdtvity  of Wages  to 
Unemployment,  93 Industries 
Mean value 
Wage-unemployment  sensitivity5 
Characteristic  and  year  Above  average  Below  average 
Union workers  as percent  of employment,  1976  23.9  38.3 
Private  fringe  benefits  as percent  of private 
compensation,  1971b  5.9  9.1 
Number  of employees  per establishment,  1974  64  241 
Depreciation  per employee  (dollars),  1973?  908  2,587 
Female workers  as percent  of employment,  1976  36.8  21.5 
Average  hourly  earmings  (dollars),  1976  4.65  5.86 
Coefficient  of p-,  in wage equationsd  0.65  0.70 
Sources: Earnings data and female workers  as a percent of employment for 1953-74 are from Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Employment  and Earnings, United States, 1909-75, bulletin 1312-10 (GPO,  1976). Data 
for 1975 and  1976 are from Employment  and Earnings, vol. 22 (March 1976), and ibid., vol. 24 (March 
1977). The unionization rate was estimated by dividing the number of workers in key and nonkey con- 
tracts from a BLS computer listing by payroll employment in  1976. (This listing excludes some workers 
participating in  smaller agreements.) Depreciation estimates are from  U.S.  Internal Revenue Service, 
Statistics of Income-1973,  Corporation  Income Tax Returns (GPO,  1977), table 1, and were divided by 
1973 payroll employment. Employees per establishment  is from U.S. Bureau  of the Census, County  Business 
Patterns, 1974: U.S. Summary, CPB-74-1 (GPO, 1977), table  lB. The fringe benefits data are from U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of  Manufactures,  1970-1971 (GPO,  1973), pp.  143-50. 
a.  Based on the unemployment coefficient in industry wage equations as  described in the text,  Of  93 
industries, 42 had unemployment coefficients above the mean, and 51 were below it. 
b. Excludes legally required fringe benefits such as social security contributions. Data are for manu- 
facturing industries only. Years after 1971 could not be used because of a change in the standard  industrial 
classification code. 
c.  Excludes ordnance, for  which data are not available. 
d. The p-i  -  year-to-year change in the CPI, lagged one year over the period 1954-76 or 1959-76. 
brings  formal,  long-term  arrangements  that reflect  equity  considerations. 
Large  plants  imply  bureaucratic  and  centralized  wage-determination  pro- 
cedures.  High capitalization  implies  that  labor  costs are a smaller  propor- 
tion of total costs. And in the face of unionization,  high capitalization- 
with its accompanying  load of heavy  fixed costs-may  lead to strike  vul- 
nerability.  Female  employees  and low-wage  employees  generally  tend to 
have less of an attachment  to the firm  in particular  as well as to the work 
force in general  and are more  likely to take  part-time  employment.  They 
are less likely to embody  specific  human  capital,  and therefore  their  cost 
1971), pp. 163-83; and Michael L. Wachter, "Primary  and Secondary Labor Mar- 
kets: A Critique of the Dual Approach,"  BPEA, 3: 1974, pp. 637-80. A major dif- 
ference between dual theorists and their critics is the issue of why certain types of 
firms and industries have extensive internal labor markets. The explanation is less 
important  for purposes  of this article than the observation  that these firms  have such 
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of turnover  to the employer  is reduced.  Fringe benefits  tend to tie the 
employee  to the employer  and make  turnover  costly. 
The differential  levels of sensitivity  of wage setting  to business  condi- 
tions have obvious  implications  for public  policy. Traditionally  when  in- 
flation  rates are high, anti-inflation  policy has relied  heavily on demand 
restraint.  If certain  groups do not react to such restraint,  other groups 
must  be made  to react  more  strongly,  given  a particular  disinflation  target. 
In other  words,  in periods  when policy  is aimed  at reducing  inflation,  the 
insulation  of wage  determination  from  real  business  conditions  means  that 
deeper recessions are required  to fight inflation,  that disinflation  goals 
must be more moderate,  or that some means  other than simple  demand 
management  must  be sought  to curb  inflation.  In a period  of low inflation, 
the insulation  of wages from real business  conditions  allows unemploy- 
ment to be reduced  without  adding  much  to inflation,  at least in the short 
run. 
CONTRACT  DURATION 
Because  insulation  is associated  with contract  duration,  it must  be as- 
sumed  that the insulated  portion  of the union sector has grown  since the 
1940s and 1950s. Long-term  labor contracts  represent  an innovation 
usually associated  with the contract in 1948 between General  Motors 
and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural  Implement 
Workers  of America.  The automobile  example  gradually  was adopted  i 
other sectors during  the 1950s and 1960s and has become the norm in 
much  of the union  sector.  In 1975, for example,  of the 1,514 major  pri- 
vate agreements  known  to the BLS, only 83 were less than twenty-four 
months  in duration.8"  The short-term  agreements  shown in table 2 that 
provide the overall union sector with significant  life-of-contract  sen- 
sitivity  to the unemployment  rate tend to be concentrated  in the earlier 
part of the period  investigated.  Reopeners,  which  can effectively  shorten 
long-term  contracts,  are generally  associated  with inflation  rather  than 
with unemployment. 
An option  for public  policy might  be a deliberate  program  of shorten- 
38.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Characteristics,  p. 7. As late as 1962, long-term 
contracts  with deferred  increments  and escalators  were considered  a sufficient  novelty 
to induce the Brookings Institution  to publish a book on the subject.  See Joseph W. 
Garbarino,  Wage  Policy and Long-Term  Contracts  (Brookings  Institution, 1962). 566  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
ing labor  agreements.  At present,  although  long-term  agreements  are  usu- 
ally considered  desirable,  the only public  policy that actively  encourages 
their use-the  "contract  bar rule" of  the National Labor Relations 
Board-probably has little impact  on the behavior  of the parties  where 
collective bargaining  relationships  have been longstanding.39  Thus the 
development  of the long-term  agreement  can be viewed primarily  as a 
private  response  of the parties  themselves.  If parties  who would usually 
choose a long-term  contract  are forced  to negotiate  one-year  agreements, 
it is not clear  that they would  behave  in the same  manner  as parties  who 
voluntarily  chose  such  arrangements. 
Forced shorter  durations  might  not bring  about  more  wage sensitivity 
to business  conditions,  but would almost  certainly  result  in a substantial 
increase  in strike  activity.  Some statistical  studies  have been conducted 
to explain  the propensity  to strike.40  What  is not fully appreciated  is the 
degree to which the number  of workers  involved in strikes  in a given 
period  is simply  a reflection  of the number  of workers  under  expiring  con- 
tracts.4'  Over the perod  1968-75,  68 percent of workers  affected  by 
stoppages  were involved  in strikes  over renegotiation  issues.42  Moreover, 
the recent  record  in certain  industries  suggests  that some strike  activity  is 
almost  inevitably  linked to contract  expiration.  Among others,  these in- 
clude the automobile  and rubber  industries.  And after  the coal strike  of 
late 1977 and early 1978, most policymakers  would  probably  prefer  not 
to deal  with  annual  coal  negotiations. 
ESCALATORS 
The question  of escalator  clauses  is closely  related  to the issue of con- 
tract duration.  Escalators  are typically associated  with long-term  con- 
39. The contract bar rule provides that the National Labor Relations Board will 
not consider petitions from rival unions or for decertification  of a union during the 
life of a contract less than two years in duration. Threat of controls may also be 
an inducement to negotiate long-term arrangements  and escalators because control 
authorities  may be expected  to make exceptions  for increments  under such contracts. 
40.  Orley Ashenfelter and  George  E.  Johnson, "Bargaining Theory,  Trade 
Unions, and Industrial  Strike  Activity,"  American  Economic Review, vol. 59 (March 
1969),  pp.  35-49;  Albert Rees, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations  " 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 60 (October 1952), pp. 371-82. 
41.  Bruce E. Kaufman, "The Propensity  to Strike in American Manufacturing," 
in Barbara D.  Dennis, ed., Proceedings of  the Thirtieth Annual Winter Meeting, 
1977, Industrial  Relations Research Association Series (IRRA, 1978), pp. 419-26. 
42. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Analysis of Work Stoppages,  various issues. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  567 
tracts  and, indeed, help to make long-term  contracts  possible.4"  Debate 
has occasionally  arisen  over  whether  escalators  are inflationary."  Escala- 
tors-especially  quarterly  escalators-obviously hasten the impact of 
price on wages.  But except  for very short  periods,  it is not clear that this 
adds  to inflation,  unless  asymmetries  can  be adduced  in response  to price- 
wage shocks.  Escalators  undoubtedly  influenced  and may have enlarged 
the adjustment  of wages  to the OPEC  price  increases  of late 1973. But in 
years such as 1976, when the relatively  slow rise in food prices  reduced 
the rate of inflation  dramatically,  escalated  wages quickly  reflected  this 
movement.  Tables 1 and 2 suggest that nonescalated  union wages and 
nonunion  wages also are influenced  by price  movements.45  Thus a hypo- 
thetical  banning  of escalator  clauses  would  not break  the wage-price  link- 
age. But previously  escalated  agreements  would  probably  be shortened  in 
average  duration  in the absence  of escalators,  thus raising  strike  activity. 
It is uncertain  whether  negotiators  who previously  used a formula  to tie 
their  wages  to prices  could  continue  to obtain  the net results  of escalation 
through  frequent  contract  renegotiation. 
WAGE  PATTERNS 
Relative  wage standing  seemed  to play a role in the equations  based  on 
contract  data in table 2. Even when the coefficient  of REL was not sig- 
nificant,  it was always  negative.  In crude  equations  such as those  used to 
separate  industries  by unemployment  sensitivity  in table  4 the addition  of 
a relative  wage variable  usually  produces  a negative  coefficient.4"  What 
43.  In a sample of major contracts in 1975, 11 percent of the agreements  for less 
than twenty-four months had escalators, compared to 35 percent of  contracts for 
twenty-four to thirty-five  months and 49 percent of contracts for thirty-six months 
and longer. See U.S. Bureau  of Labor Statistics,  Characteristics,  p. 47. 
44.  H. M. Douty, Cost-of-Living  Escalator Clauses and Inflation, U.S. Council 
on Wage and Price Stability (GPO,  1975);  Robert H.  Ferguson, Cost-of-Living 
Adjustments in  Union-Management  Agreements, bulletin 65  (Cornell University, 
State School of Industrial  and Labor Relations, 1976), pp. 43-47. 
45.  In table 4 the equations used to separate industries  by unemployment  sensi- 
tivity had a mean coefficient for p-1 of 0.67. If industries above (below)  that level 
are grouped, their average unionization rate is 35.4 percent (28.5 percent). Thus 
union wages appear somewhat more sensitive to prices than nonunion wages. But 
there is obviously considerable  overlap between the two groups. 
46.  A variable was added to the 93 equations consisting of the ratio of hourly 
earnings in each industry to average hourly earnings for the entire sample, and the 
ratio was lagged one year. This variable was standardized  by dividing it by the 1958 
ratio. The equations were run for the period 1959-76. Negative signs appeared  in 71 
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this suggests  is that some force or combination  of forces tends to drive, 
or herd,  industries  together.  This is not a new finding.  It has been known 
for some time that hourly  earnings  across  industries  tend to retain  their 
relative  ranking,  even  over  very  long  periods.'7 
The finding  of a herd  instinct  in wage setting  probably  has less signifi- 
cance  for anti-inflation  efforts  than  some  policymakers  appear  to believe. 
Recently  economists  have become interested  in the influence  of pattern 
bargaining  (wage-imitation)  in wage determination.  It is known,  for ex- 
ample,  that certain  groups  of industries  seem to tie their  bargaining  out- 
comes together.  For example,  automobiles,  automobile  parts,  trucks,  and 
farm  machinery  form a sphere  of wage determination."8  Various  factors 
may  help to explain  the existence  of this sphere:  a common  union,  inter- 
company  sales, geographic  proximity,  and product-market  competition 
(for  example, Ford makes tractors; International  Harvester makes 
trucks).  There  seems  to be a metals  sphere  that  ties together  wages  in basic 
steel,  nonferrous  metals,  metal  mining,  and  metal  containers.  Yet another 
sphere  appears  to center  around  the national  master  freight  agreement  of 
the International  Brotherhood  of Teamsters,  Chauffeurs,  Warehousemen 
and  Helpers  of America,  which  influences  wages  in smaller  trucking  settle- 
ments,  warehousing,  and to some extent, retail food. Thus in reviewing 
the outcome  of the automobile,  steel, or trucking  settlements  in 1979 and 
1980, policymakers  obviously  should  put a multiplier  coefficient  on the 
number  of workers  affected  by each  agreement. 
Yet it is apparent  from  recent  statements  that  policymakers  sometimes 
operate on the assumption  that there is a strong, well-defined  linkage 
among  the spheres,  so that  manipulating  one contract  will manipulate  all. 
In particular,  much  emphasis  has been  placed  on the Teamsters'  negotia- 
tion due to take place in early 1979.49  Little definitive  evidence  exists  to 
support  this  view. It is known  that  wage  adjustments  across  industries  are 
47.  Donald E. Cullen, 'The  Interindustry  Wage Structure, 1899-1950," Amer- 
ican Economic Review, vol. 46 (June 1956), pp. 353-69. 
48.  Dunlop refers to such spheres as "wage contours."  Arthur Ross calls them 
"orbits  of coercive comparison."  See John T. Dunlop, "The Task of Contemporary 
Wage Theory," in John T. Dunlop, ed., The Theory of Wage Determination (Lon- 
don: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 17; Arthur M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy 
(University of California, Institute of Industrial  Relations, 1948), p. 53. 
49.  Barry Bosworth, director of  the Council on Wage and Price Stability, is 
quoted as stating that if "we could get the Teamsters  to agree to 20 percent for three 
years, the United Auto Workers  would sign a contract for the same thing. So would 
steel. Each of these unions wants what the other one has got." See Hobart Rowen, 
"Bosworth  Says U.S. Fumbles Rail Talks," Washington  Post, June 16, 1978. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  569 
highly  intercorrelated,  but  this  observation  does not say much  about  what 
causes the similarity.  Indeed, wage changes and price changes are so 
highly correlated  that it is difficult  to distinguish  wage-wage  from price- 
wage inflation,  using  equations  such as those of tables 1 and  2.50 
There are obviously  common  factors affecting  all industries,  such as 
the rate  of price  inflation.  In construction,  where  the occurrence  of wage 
imitation  has been  well documented,  attempts  to trace  the  precise  patterns 
have met with mixed results.51  Outside construction  the issue is quite 
nebulous.52  In the absence  of general  guidelines,  it might  be argued  that 
holding  back  the Teamsters,  if it could  be done, could  not hurt  in terms  of 
slowing  wage  inflation;  but  it is not clear  that  it would  help. An economic 
unit that considered  the Teamsters'  settlement  as a relevant  guide to its 
behavior  might abandon  that plan if the Teamsters  were subject  to ob- 
vious government  manipulation.  And in any case, no one knows  what  the 
result  of the Teamsters'  ripple  effect  will be after  it leaves the immediate 
sphere  of influence.53 
50. Within  the contract  data, the correlation  coefficient,  R, between  p-X and w-l is 
0.8, where  the latter is the year-to-year  rate of change in the hourly  earnings  index for 
production  and nonsupervisory  workers  in the private  nonfarm  economy. For short- 
term  contracts  the coefficient  is 0.6; for long-term  escalated  contracts,  0.9; and for long- 
term nonescalated  contracts,  0.9. The wage-wage  equivalent  to 4 of table 2 is 
LIFE =  15.80 +  0.54w-l +  10.58UV1  +  0.42COLA  -  16.38REL  +  2.53D7376. 
K2 =  0.52; standard error =  2.01. 
(All coefficients  are significant  at a level of 5 percent  or more.)  The equation's  coefficient 
of  determination  is  marginally lower and the standard error is  marginally  higher 
than those of 4, but the discrepancy  is negligible.  In some equations,  the wage-wage 
version  is a slight "winner"  of the A2  contest; in others  it is a slight "loser."  Much the 
same is true of the manufacturing  wage equations  of table 1. The correlation  coefficient 
of P-, and w-, during  the period 1960-76 is 0.9. 
51. See David E. Shulenburger,  "Wage  Leadership  and Patterns of Wage Settle- 
ment in Construction,"  in Proceedings of  the Thirtieth Annual Winter Meeting, 
IRRA Series, pp. 185-92. 
52.  For example, after an empirical investigation, Y. P. Mehra finds little sup- 
port for the wage spillover hypothesis in manufacturing.  See his "Spillovers  in Wage 
Determination in U.S. Manufacturing Industries,"  Review of Economics and Sta- 
tistics, vol. 58 (August 1976), pp. 300-12. 
53. A  recent review of  the literature on spillover and wage rounds concluded 
that "the apparent  variability  of round phenomena makes it useless as a forecasting 
device. ...  Without a theory of the wage round, the concept can only be applied in 
a retrospective fashion, as a valuable tool of  historical explanation perhaps-but 
not as a tool of  economic science." John Burton and John Addison, "The Institu- 
tionalist Analysis of  Wage Inflation: A  Critical Appraisal,"  in Ronald G. Ehren- 
berg, ed., Research in Labor Economics: An Annual Compilation of Research, vol. 
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Sometimes  the word "pattern"  is used to describe  the spread  of inno- 
vative arrangements.  For example,  after  the United  Auto Workers  nego- 
tiated a supplemental  unemployment  benefits  program  with the auto- 
mobile industry  in 1955, the idea was adopted  in other industries.  The 
current  contract  of the Chrysler  Corporation  with  the United  Auto Work- 
ers contains  an embryonic  legal services  plan  which,  if proved  successful, 
might  provide  a model  for such  programs  elsewhere.  Innovative  patterns 
in compensation  are  not confined  to unions;  the spread  of executive  stock 
option  plans  is an example  from  the nonunion  sector.  However,  the main 
point about innovative  patterns  is that they involve the structure  of the 
compensation  package  rather  than the magnitude.  Policymakers  should 
not assume  that such patterns  are symptoms  of magnitude  patterns. 
Economists are primarily  concerned  with magnitude  patterns.  And 
here  contradictory  anecdotal  evidence  can  be cited.  It is known,  for exam- 
ple, that immediately  after  World  War  II, rounds  of wage settlements- 
expressed  in cents per hour-occurred in diverse  industries,  beginning 
with an eighteen-and-one-half-cent  round  in 1946. This type of behavior 
was reinforced  by the judicial review process of the wage controls of 
World  War  II (and later the Korean  War) in which  principles  of prece- 
dence and equal treatment  tended  to tie settlements  together.  Since that 
time,  however,  some  developments  have  weakened  the tendency  to follow 
patterns.  Among these are the increased  complexity  of the compensation 
package  relative  to the standard,  one-year,  flat increases  of the 1940s. 
Fringe  benefits,  work  rules,  and  variegated  escalator  formulas  make  cross- 
industry  comparisons  more difficult.  And the once-tight  administrative 
linkage  between  the old CIO  industrial  unions  has  been  loosened. 
Policymakers  ought  to be cautious  about  accepting  the folk wisdom  of 
industrial  relations.  Government  officials  consoled themselves  with the 
widely accepted  view that the large coal settlement  of March 1978 was 
not generally  thought  to set a pattern.  On the one hand, that settlement 
might have conveyed  to the Teamsters  that government  resolve quickly 
crumbles  in the face of economic  disruption.  Did not workers  in the petro- 
leum  industry  (who will negotiate  in January  1979) also learn  from  that 
settlement  about  the potential  for wage  increases  in the energy  field,  even 
in the face of a significant  nonunion  sector?  On the other  hand,  until  the 
mid-1960s,  it was believed  that the United  Rubber,  Cork,  Linoleum  and 
Plastic Workers  of America  followed the settlements  in the automobile 
industry  at the major  tire companies.  After  that,  management  in the rub- Daniel  J. B. Mitchell  571 
ber industry  appeared  to break  the linkage,  resulting  in a string  of rubber 
settlements  in which  wages  rose less rapidly  than  those  in the automobile 
industry. 
In the context of guidelines  or a program  of formal  controls,  visible 
settlements  will be watched  by other economic  units for indications  that 
the government  will enforce  the standards  strictly  or that the guidelines 
can be ignored  with impunity.  Since the guidelines  will be in effect in 
1979, the Teamsters'  negotiations  must  now be regarded  as a key settle- 
ment, simply  because  they will come early  in the year and will be widely 
reported  in the news media.  But under  usual  circumstances  the herd  phe- 
nomenon in wage determination  does not provide policymakers  with 
definitive guides on  where direct intervention  might yield important 
leverage. If jawboning  is believed to be desirable,  a general guideline 
(ideally one determined  through  a consultative  process), combined  with 
pressures  on as many  settlements  as possible,  would  seem  the appropriate 
course  of action.  The alternative  of trying  to identify  the key settlement 
is risky  at best. 
Outlook  for  Union  Wage  Determination  in 1979 
As is generally  the case, a significant  proportion  of union workers  in 
1979 will experience  wage increases  that  have been stipulated  in existing 
contracts.  As of early  September  1978, the BLS had information  on 4.1 
million private-sector  workers  in the major  union sector who are slated 
for some form of deferred  increase  in 1979.54  Another  2 million  workers 
were either negotiating,  about to negotiate,  or concluding  contracts  for 
which data  were not yet available.  Based on preliminary  tabulations,  de- 
ferred wage adjustments  under nonescalated  contracts  are expected to 
average  6.7 percent. Escalated contracts  will provide adjustments,  ex- 
cluding  escalator  payments,  averaging  3.7 percent.  If it were  assumed  that 
the escalators  under these contracts  provided  the recent average  of 57 
percent  inflation  protection  and that the rate of inflation  was about 7?/2 
percent, the combination  of deferred  and escalator  payments  would be 
about 8 percent.55  Wages  in the deferred  sector  would then rise approxi- 
mately  7 ?2  percent.  On  average,  workers  under  deferred  agreements  would 
54. Victor J. Sheifer of the BLS supplied  these estimates. 
55. The 57 percent estimate is from Sheifer, "Collective Bargaining." 572  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
experience  no sigficant  change  in real  wages.  This  would  not be the out- 
come if a different  rate of inflation  prevailed.  With 6 percent  inflation, 
the average  deferred  wage increase (including  escalator adjustments) 
would  be about  7 percent,  and  real  wages  would  rise on average. 
Estimates  for deferred  increases  in fringe benefits  are not presently 
available.  In 1978, in percentage  terms,  deferred  increases  in wages and 
benefits  combined  for agreements  covering  5,000 or more  workers  slightly 
exceeded  the increases  in wages  alone  for the entire  major  union  sector.56 
Because  some of those contracts  will still contain  provision  for deferred 
payments  in 1979, it is possible that the relationship  will be repeated. 
And labor  costs to all employers  will be affected  by increased  social  secu- 
rity  payroll  taxes  in 1979. 
In the union sector the principal  unknown  element  is the magnitude 
of the adjustment  under  contracts  that must be renegotiated.  As of late 
1977, the BLS already  knew of 3.6 million  workers  in the major  union 
sector  whose contracts  were set to expire  or reopen  in 1979.57  About 11 
percent  of workers  under  contracts  concluded  during  the first  half  of 1978 
negotiated  one-year  agreements  that  will expire  in 1979.58  Thus  the  wages 
of about  4 million  workers  in the major  sector  will be negotiated  in 1979. 
Table 5 presents  a summary  of the rate of wage increase  experienced 
under  the last three  contracts  of the five negotiating  groups  likely to re- 
ceive the majority  of public attention  (and probably  government  atten- 
tion) in 1979.5'  Their real wage gains during  the 1970s are impressive. 
In 1973, three  of the five slipped  behind  the marked  acceleration  in price 
inflation-as did many  other  groups  in both union and  nonunion  sectors. 
56. LeRoy, "Scheduled  Wage Increases,"  pp. 4-5. 
57. Lena W. Bolton, "Bargaining  Calendar  to be Light in 1978,"  Monthly Labor 
Review, vol. 100 (December 1977), p. 37. 
58.  U.S. Department of Labor, News, USDL-78-656, July 27, 1978, table 6. 
59.  Most of the cost estimates in the table come from data published  by the U.S. 
Council on Wage and Price Stability. In developing estimates of the 1976 settle- 
ments, the council assumed CPI inflation  of 6 percent a year to obtain the escalator 
effect. The figures in table 5 are based on an assumption of a rise of 7 percent a 
year in the CPI and include an allowance for the additional  "roll-up"  effect on fringe 
benefits (the indirect effect of a wage increase on fringe benefits) when wage and 
benefit  estimates  are given. Data on the 1970 meat-packing  contract are based on in- 
crements  reported  by the BLS in Wage Chronology:  Armour  and Company,  1941-72 
(GPO,  1971)  and in a  1975 supplement to this bulletin. The base wage for the 
1970 contract was extrapolated  backward  from an estimate by the Council on Wage 
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Table S.  timates  of Anal  Rate of Wage  Increases  under  Selected  Coliective 
Bri  ng  Agreements,  1970, 1973, and 1976 
Percent 
Life of 
the contractb  1976 
Life of 
Compensation  the con-  First 
Parties to the agreement"  Index  1970  1973  tract0  yeard 
Trucking  Employers,  Inc.,  Wages  12.7  6.6  10.1  9.1 
and Teamsters  Wages  and benefits  12.6  7.9  10.4  9.7 
General  Electric  Company  Wages  6.7  6.6  10.4  13.1 
and Electrical  Workers 
(IUE) 
"Big five"  rubber  com-  Wages  7.1  5.5  12.2  17.1 
pariese  and United  Wages  and benefits  ...  ...  10.4  ... 
Rubber Workers 
"Bigthree"automobile  Wages  8.7  9.7  9.1  5.9 
companiesf  and United  Wages  and benefits  ...  ...  10.4  8.3 
Auto Workers 
Major  meat packers  and  Wages  6.6  12.1  8.5  2.4 
meat cutters 
Addenda 
Consumer  price  indexg  ...  4.4  8.7  7.0h  6.9 
Hourly  earnings  indexs  ...  6.5  8.1  ...  7.1 
Sources: Wage increases  are derived  from data in U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability press releases 
CWPS-189, September 24, 1976; CWPS-225, January 13, 1977, and "1976 Collective Bargaining  Negotia- 
tions:  A  Background Paper," January 1976; Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Wage Chronology:  Armour  and 
Company, 1941-72,  bulletin 1682 (GPO,  1971), table A,  and  Wage Chronology: Armour and Company 
and Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen  of North America, September 1973-August 1976, 
supplement to bulletin 1682 (BLS, 1975). The increases in the CPI and earnings index are from official 
BLS data. 
a.  The official names of the labor unions appear in appendix table A-1. 
b. Includes escalator payments. 
c.  Includes escalator payments on assumption of an increase of 7 percent a year in the CPI. 
d. Excludes escalator payments. 
e.  Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, General Tire and Rubber Company, B. F. Goodrich Company, 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, and Uniroyal, Inc. 
f.  Chrysler  Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation. 
g.  June-to-June  basis, 1970-73, 1973-76, 1976-79, 1976-77, respectively. 
h. Assumed. See note c above. 
But  those  who  slipped  in  1973  appeared  to  have  recovered  lost  ground 
in their  1976  contracts. 
The  underlying  conditions  in the five groups  are quite  varied.  Only  the 
Teamsters  are  capable  of  creating  a true  "national  emergency"  dispute. 
The  BLS  records  on  union  contracts  in trucking  and  warehousing  (SIC 
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unionized.?0  Yet it would  be a mistake  to assume  that  the nonnion sector 
of trucking  could  easily  take  up the slack  in the case of a strike.  Trucking 
is an interconnected  industry  in which disruptions  at one location can 
quickly  tie up others.  Indeed, this interconnection  has historically  been 
an important  technique  of the Teamsters  in organizing  nonunion  truck- 
ing companies  and firms  in other industries  that rely on trucks.6"  A na- 
tional trucking  strike  would quickly  divert  government  attention  to the 
issue of halting  and settling  the dispute  through  the use of a Taft-Hartley 
act injunction  or by other means.  The question  of wage restraint  could 
easily  be forgotten  under  the pressures  that  a strike  would  create. 
Electrical  manufacturing  and  meat  packing  both have substantial  non- 
union capacity.  Moreover,  not all union  workers  are covered  by the mas- 
ter  agreement.  A strike  in either  industry  would  obviously  disrupt  produc- 
tion, but nonstriking  plants are often not dependent  on supplies  from 
striking  plants  and can continue  in operation.  Several  unions  participate 
in bargaining  in the electrical  manufacturing  industry,  a factor  that  at one 
time prevented  a united front on the labor side. Since the late 1960s, 
however,  the unions  have coordinated  their  efforts.  2 
In the rubber  industry,  the United Rubber Workers  represents  the 
majority  of union workers  employed;  the industry  is heavily,  but not ex- 
clusively,  unionized.  However,  the union has a tradition  of decentraliza- 
tion, so that  demands  at the major  companies  are  not always  closely  coor- 
60. This estimate of unionization is obtained by dividing the BLS estimate of 
workers  covered by union agreements  as of early 1978 by 1977 payroll employment. 
Because the BLS estimates are made at the time of negotiations,  earlier employment 
must be used. These estimates are reasonably complete for agreements covering 
1,000 or more workers, but are incomplete for smaller contracts. Thus the figures 
underestimate  total union coverage. 
61.  See Ralph and Estelle James, "Hoffa's  Leverage Techniques in Bargaining,"9 
Industrial  Relations, vol. 3 (October 1963), pp. 73-93. 
62. The General Electric Company followed a practice known as "Boulwarism" 
during the 1950s and early 1960s (placing its intended final offer on the table in the 
initial stages of bargaining). The company would then adamantly  hold to the offer 
unless the unions could provide technical arguments  to convince the company that 
it  should modify its position. Many of  the unions at General Electric agreed to 
coordinate their bargaining during the 1966 negotiations, but the company did not 
change its tactics. In the 1969 negotiations,  however, the unions-spurred  by favor- 
able court decisions and support  from the AFL-CIO-were  able to induce a notice- 
able improvement  in the company's offer. See Abraham Cohen, "Coordinated  Bar- 
gaining at General Electric: An Analysis" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 
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dinated.  Those companies  have  formed  a pact  of mutual  aid that  provides 
financial  assistance  to firms  on strike.  Strikes  in the rubber  industry  can 
be long and bitter. But experience  in the 1976 strike suggests  that the 
economic  effects  can  be confined  largely  to the industry  itself.  At that  time, 
replacement  tires were easily available  to the general  public  through  in- 
ventories,  imports,  nonunion operations,  and nonstriking  plants. Tires 
that  were  original  equipment  for new  cars  posed  more  of a problem.  How- 
ever, the substitution  of a company-issued  IOU for the spare  tire cut de- 
mand  by 20 percent  and  enabled  most  models  of new  cars  to be delivered. 
Automobile  strikes  traditionally  have been aimed at one company  at 
a time. When General  Motors is the target  company,  its sheer size can 
have noticeable  impact  on the national  income  accounts,  as it did during 
the 1970 walkout.63  Virtually  all production  workers  in the industry  are 
unionized, and most belong to the United Auto Workers.  Inventory 
buildups  prior to strikes are difficult  because of the cost and timing  of 
new model automobiles.  And the union has a reputation  for being disci- 
plined and coordinated  during  negotiations.  Imports  are a factor in the 
product  market,  but recent  movements  in exchange  rates  have weakened 
foreign  competition.  And the new Volkswagen  plant  in Pennsylvania  has 
already  been unionized." 
No model can yield forecasts  of the outcomes  of specific  contracts  on 
which any confidence  can be placed. However,  the equations  of table 2 
can be used  to project  changes  in average  union  wages,  providing  assump- 
tions are made about  the underlying  explanatory  variables.  Because  the 
COLA variable  is one of these and because  it may be influenced  by the 
bargaining  outcomes  themselves-as well as by other  public  policy mea- 
sures-one  can ask  whether  the projected  outcomes  seem consistent  with 
the assumed  movement  of prices  in the future.  This question  will be ad- 
dressed  below. Initially  it will be assumed  that no guidelines  were to be 
in effect.  A discussion  of the impact  of the guidelines  follows. 
63.  Annual GNP fell by $10.6 billion from 1970:3 to 1970:4 in 1972 dollars. 
Gross automobile output fell by $11.7 billion. 
64.  Volkswagen remained entirely neutral during  the representation  election and 
was complimented by the union for its stance. See "Auto Workers File for Repre- 
sentation Vote at Volkswagen in Pennsylvania,"  Bureau of National Affairs, Daily 
Labor Report, May 17, 1978, p. A-2. The United Auto Workers enjoy good rela- 
tions with their counterparts  in the German union who have representation  on vari- 
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Table  6. Esmated  Union  Wage  Changes  In  the  Absence  of Gidelines,  1979' 
Percent 
No shift in the mid-1970s?  Permanent  shift  in the  mid-1970se 
LIFE  LIFE 
Without  With  Without  With 
escalator  escalator  escalator  escalator 
Duration  of  FIRSTd  provisions provisions  FIRSTd  provisions provisions 
contractb  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
All  durations  7.5  6.1  8.1  7.4  7.2  9.0 
Short-term  4.9  5.5  5.5  5.2  6.5  6.5 
Long-term 
Escalated  9.0  5.9  9.9  8.8  7.1  10.3 
Nonescalated  8.2  6.5  6.5  7.8  7.2  7.2 
Source: Based on equations of table 2. 
a.  See text for the assumptions underlying  these projections. 
b. Short-term  contracts are for eleven to seventeen months; long-term, eighteen or more months. 
c.  The no-shift projections use equations from table 2 without D7376. The permanent-shift  projections 
use equations from table 2 with D7376, maintaining the value of  D7376 at 1.0 in the projections. LIFE 
and FIRST are defined in table 2, note b. 
d. Escalator increases are excluded. 
PREGUIDELINE  OUTLOOK 
Table 6 provides  a projection  of 1979 wage outcomes  based on the 
equations  of table  2. It is assumed  that  the lagged  inflation  variable  (p-1) 
takes  on a value  of 7.3 percent,  that  unemployment  averages  6.2 percent, 
that price change  during  the life of the contract  averages  7.5 percent  a 
year, and that the relative  wage variable  (REL) has a value of 1.05 in 
1979.6f5  Even with these assumptions,  table 2 leaves an open question. 
65.  The 7.3 percent estimate for P-i is based on the assumption that inflation 
during 1978 wMl  taper off in the latter part of the year, producing a December-to- 
December rate of about 8 percent. The unemployment  rate of 6.2 percent shows a 
slight increase above the level at the time this article was prepared.  An increase of a 
full 1 percentage  point to 7.2 percent  would reduce the overall predictions  for FIRST 
by only 0.4 percentage  point and the LIFE predictions  by even less. The assumption 
that inflation will average 7.5 percent over the three years beginning  in 1979 is arbi- 
trary  and based largely on the assertion  that was commonly voiced prior to the guide- 
lines that the "underlying"  rate of inflation  was in the range of 7 to 8 percent. Note 
that in the overall equations the COLA variable is zero for nonescalated contracts. 
It was assumed  that escalated contracts  would cover about 60 percent  of the workers 
negotiating  contracts in 1979. Hence, COLA was inserted  in the overall equations as 
7.5 percent multiplied  by 0.60. The 60 percent  figure  is the average number  of work- 
ers estimated  to be under escalated contracts  during  the period 1976:1 through  1978:2 Daniel  J.  B. Mitchell  577 
Some equations  in table 2 were estimated  on the assumption  that a shift 
occurred  in the wage-setting  process toward  the end of the observation 
period, as reflected  in D7376. Obviously,  alternative  assumptions  about 
the nature of  the shift-whether  it was permanent  or temporary  or 
whether  it existed  at all-will  result  in differing  projections. 
As already  noted,  the timing  of the possible  shift  in the mid-1970s  un- 
fortunately  coincided  with a period of extreme  values of the price and 
unemployment  variables.  The dummy  is undoubtedly  "stealing"  some of 
its significance  from  the other  explanatory  variables.  In the case  in table  2 
in which D7376 produced  a significant  coefficient,  the coefficient  of the 
lagged  price  change  and  COLA  variables  fell in magnitude.  This  tendency 
is especially  noticeable  for the short-term  contracts  in which the coeffi- 
cient of the lagged  price change  drops  from  0.77 to 0.06. Where  the un- 
employment  coefficient  was significant,  a significant  dummy  coefficient 
also lowered its magnitude.  In short, while the equations  without the 
dummy  may  be somewhat  biased  by not reflecting  a possible  shift  in struc- 
ture, the equations  with the dummy  are clearly  distorted. 
It seems appropriate,  therefore,  to confine  the projections  to just two 
of the possible assumptions  about a shift in wage determination  in the 
mid-1970s. The first assumption  is that no shift occurred,  and that the 
equations  without the dummy  can be used to make future projections 
with reasonable  accuracy.  A second assumption  is that a structural  shift 
in wage determination  did occur, and that the effect of this shift is still 
present.  Because of distorting  effects  of D7376 on the other  coefficients, 
in the nonconstruction sector. (Nonconstruction was used because the settlements 
included in the union contract data included no construction  situations.) About 12 
percent of construction workers were assumed to be under escalator clauses, based 
on  a  1975 BLS survey. The data on workers under escalated agreements and in 
nonconstruction  agreements  comes from Current  Wage  Developments,  vol. 29 (April 
1977),  p.  48;  Finger, "Wage-rate Increases," p.  54; and Department of  Labor, 
USDL-78-656, table 1. The estimate of construction  workers  under escalators  comes 
from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Characteristics,  p. 46. The value of REL posed a 
special problem. The last value of REL for each of the seventeen situations in the 
union contracts used for the table 2 regressions averaged a little less than 1.03 for 
contracts whose initial date was in the  1973-74 period. Average hourly earnings, 
lagged one year, are the denominator  of REL (before standardization).  This series 
increased about  55  percent from  mid-1972 to  mid-1978. Effective mean  wage 
changes in the major union sector were estimated to average just under 60 percent 
from 1973 to  1978. (The  1978 figure was the estimate for the first six months of 
1978 compounded to an annual rate.) With allowance for rounding,  this suggests a 
value for REL of about 1.05 in 1979. 578  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
projections  based on an assumed  temporary  shift cannot  be expected  to 
produce  reasonable  results.68  Hence the projection  results  in table  6 show 
only  estimates  of no shift  and  a permanent  shift. 
Obviously  the more disaggregated  estimates  of table 6 are subject  to a 
lesser  degree  of confidence  than  the aggregates.  For example,  the gap  be- 
tween FIRST and LIFE for short-term  contracts  is wider than what 
would normally  be expected  and reflects  the wage reopening  experience 
of the mid-1970s.  It might  be argued  that long-term  escalated  contracts 
should  normally  be expected  to provide  smaller  increases  in the first  year 
than  would  long-term  nonescalated  contracts.  But this  relative  effect  does 
not always  appear  in actual  data. In 1977, for example,  major  escalated 
contracts  had first-year  wage adjustments  averaging  8.0 percent,  com- 
pared  with 7.6 percent  for nonescalated  contracts.67  The overall results 
suggest  that an ongoing  inflation  rate of 7.5 percent  beginning  in 1979 
would  be consistent  with the wage-rate  adjustments  over the life of con- 
tracts  averaging  8 to 9 percent.  A softening  of business  conditions  would 
reduce  this projection  somewhat. 
A more optimistic  view of future  price inflation  would lower the esti- 
mates  of table 6 through  the escalator  mechanism.  However,  because  not 
all contracts  have escalators  and because  lagged  price inflation  plays an 
important  role in the equations,  the impact  is limited.  For all contracts, 
the substitution  of a 6 percent  future  price  inflation  rate for the 7.5 per- 
cent assumption  of table 6 would  reduce  the life-of-contract  estimates  by 
about  0.4 percentage  point. 
The estimates  for both no shift and a permanent  shift in table 6 are 
based on equations  that deal imperfectly  with the special  circumstances 
surrounding  wage determination  in the mid-1970s when controls were 
lifted and inflation  accelerated.  Despite  the deficiencies  in the equations, 
the projections  of table  6 seem  plausible.  For the first  six months  of 1978, 
66.  In some ways 1979 will have characteristics  that are similar to the period 
1973-76 in terms of the explanatory  variables. During 1973-76, the mean value of 
lagged price change was about 7.4 percent, close to the 7.3 percent estimate for 
lagged price change in 1979. The mean value of unemployment  during 1973-76 was 
6.7 percent, which is slightly higher than the 6.2 percent estimate used for  1979. 
However, the equations derive most of  their power from the price assumptions. 
Thus even though the dummy distorts the coefficients,  its presence in 1979 tends to 
compensate for the damage. If, however, the dummy were set equal to zero in 1979 
(in the case of a temporary shift),  the projections would have only the distorted 
coefficients  upon which to rely without the compensating  influence of the dummy. 
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new long-term  contracts  established  values of LIFE (excluding  escala- 
tors) of 6.7 percent.  For new short-term  contracts,  LIFE was set at 5.4 
percent.  For all new contracts,  LIFE (excluding  escalators)  was 6.6 per- 
cent.88  Negotiators  in 1978 were  looking  back at slightly  lower  lagged  in- 
flation  rates  than  what  will characterize  1979. Yet they produced  life-of- 
contract increases comparable  to those of columns 2  and 5  of table 
6. The added  push of lagged  inflation  in 1979 should  be at least partially 
offset by the relative wage effect. So the estimates of table 6 appear 
reasonable. 
Although  the projected  1979 settlements  appear  reasonable  alongside 
the results  of the 1978 negotiations,  there  is a question  of the consistency 
between  the assumed  71/2  percent  price  inflation  rate  for 1979 and  the  pro- 
jected life-of-contract  wage  increases  of 8 to 9 percent.  It is important  to 
note that  the projections  of table  6 cover  only a small  portion  of the labor 
force-that  is, workers  in the major  union sector  who will be negotiating 
new contracts.  According  to table  6, first-year  settlements  for these  work- 
ers will be about  71/2  percent  without  escalators.  Allowance  for escalators 
in the first year, fringe-benefit  increases,  and increased  social security 
taxes  would  easily  push  this figure  into the range  of 8 to 9 percent.  Major 
union  workers  under  deferred  adjustments,  as noted  earlier,  will probably 
receive  wage  increases  of about  71/2  percent  in 1979. With  allowance  for 
social security  and fringe  benefits,  this estimate  would  rise into the lower 
end of the 8 to 9 percent  range. 
If all wages  rose at a rate  of 8 to 9 percent  and  if prices  rose at 71/2  per- 
cent, a moderate  but plausible  real wage gain would result.  Thus wage 
setting  in the nonunion  and minor  union sectors  is crucial  to the issue of 
consistency  between  the projected  wage increases  and the assumed  price 
inflation  rate. On a total compensation  basis, it appears  that labor costs 
in the sector outside  the major  union work  force were also increasing  at 
an underlying  rate  of 8 to 9 percent  during  the first  half of 1978. Because 
lagged  inflation  will  be higher  in 1979 than  it is this  year,  but  will probably 
be accompanied  by rising  unemployment,  a 71/2  percent  estimate  of price 
inflation  for 1979 appears  reasonably  consistent  with the anticipated  rate 
of wage inflation  in the absence  of guidelines. 
The new guidelines  program  features  a 7 percent  wage standard  and a 
53/4  percent goal for prices. If every wage adjustment  adhered  to the 
68.  Data are from Department of Labor, USDL-78-656, p. 12. 580  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
guidelines,  the result  would obviously  be wage inflation  of 7 percent  or 
less. However, the interesting  question  is whether  this is likely to hap- 
pen-whether guidelines  might  induce  the parties  to consider  the world  a 
fundamentally  different  place  in which  7 percent  would  be a "reasonable" 
target  for wages. 
What  the equations  of table 2 cannot  answer  is the precise  structural 
route by which past inflation  affects  current  wage change.  If the lagged 
price coefficient  is viewed  as the parties'  estimate  of the future  course  of 
inflation-that is, if they extrapolate  the future  by reference  to the past, 
then  much  depends  on the credibility  of any  guidepost  program.  It is con- 
ceivable  that the parties  might be convinced  that the 53/4  percent  price 
goal was a better  indicator  of the future  than  the past  extrapolation.  If so, 
then 53/4  percent  could be substituted  for the actual  value of p-1 in the 
equations.  Under this assumption,  the life-of-contract  averages  for all 
contracts  would  center  around  7 percent.69  The averages  would  run  closer 
to 8 percent  for long-term  escalated  contracts.  This  is sufficiently  close to 
7 percent  that some bargainers  might  be willing to concentrate  on non- 
economic demands, such as job security, to comply with the official 
standard. 
TIhe  critical  point is that the optimistic  scenario  depends  critically  on 
convincing  people that the recently  experienced  rate of inflation  is not a 
good guide  to the future.  Beyond  this, it depends  on the assumption  that 
the coefficient  of p-1  does in fact represent  a projection  process.  It is pos- 
sible that the true  process  in the labor  market  is wage-wage,  and that the 
7 percent  wage  guideline  would  plug directly  into the parties'  utility  func- 
tions as the desired  rate  of wage  change.  But there  is no clear  evidence  on 
this point.70 
Absent direct intervention  or success from the guidelines  program 
along  the lines  just  described,  the  projections  of table  2 do not suggest  that 
union settlements  in 1979 would  be very  different  settlements  from  those 
of recent  years.  Nonconstruction  settlements  in 1977 over the life of the 
contract averaged 5.7 percent excluding escalator payments, and 7.0 per- 
cent for the first  six months  of 1978. Table 6 projects  a range  of 6.1 to 
69. This is approximately correct using either the 5314  percent assumption for 
price behavior to price out the COLA or the 6 percent that the guidelines program 
directs the parties to use in estimating  the value of escalators in new contracts. 
70.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the potential impact of the 
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7.2 percent  for 1979. The relative  wage effect does have a moderating 
influence  on the projections.  But none of the estimates  include  an allow- 
ance for fringe  benefits,  which have boosted  the total compensation  cost 
increase  relative  to the wage-rate  increase  in recent years. Given these 
estimates,  it is easy to understand  why the administration  opted for a 
policy of wage-price  guidelines. 
APPENDIX 
Table A-i.  Employer-Union  Agreements  Included  in Contract  Information,  by 
Standard  Industrial  Classification  of Base Wage  Data 
Standard 
Industry  division  and  employer  industrial 
or employer  association  Union  classifications 
Manufacturing 
Aluminum  Company  of America  United Steelworkers  of America  333, 334b 
Armour  and Company  Amalgamated  Meat Cutters  and  2011 
Butcher  Workmen  of North 
America 
Atlantic  Richfield  Company  Oil, Chemical  and Atomic Workers  291 
International  Union 
Berkshire  Hathaway,  Inc.  United Textile Workers  of America  22 
Boeing Company  (Washington  International  Association  of Machin-  3721 
plants)  ists and Aerospace  Workers 
Dan River Inc.  United Textile  Workers  of America  22 
Firestone  Tire and Rubber  United Rubber,  Cork, Linoleum  and  301 
Company  Plastic  Workers  of America 
Ford Motor Company  International  Union, United Auto-  371, 3711 
mobile,  Aerospace  and Agricultural 
Implement  Workers  of America 
General  Electric  Company  International  Union of Electrical,  36 
Radio and Machine  Workers  (IUE) 
International  Paper  Company  United Paperworkers  International  26 
(Southern  Kraft Division)  Union 
Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation  International  Association  of Machin-  3721 
(California)  ists and Aerospace  Workers 
United States Steel Corporation  United Steelworkers  of America  331 
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Table  A-1 (continued) 
Standard 
Industry  division  and employer  industrial 
or employer  association  Union  classificationa 
Mining 
Anaconda  Company  (Montana  United Steelworkers  of America  102 
Mining Division) 
Bituminous  Coal Mine Operators  United Mine Workers  of America  12 
Transportation 
Council of North Atlantic  Ship-  International  Longshoremen's 
ping Associations  Association 
Pacific  Maritime  Association  International  Longshoremen's  and  d 
Warehousemen's  Union 
Trucking  Employers,  Inc.  International  Brotherhood  of 
Teamsters,  Chauffeurs,  Warehouse- 
men and Helpers  of America 
Sources: Data on wage adjustments for General Electric Company and Trucking Employers, Inc., are 
from  Current Wage Developments,  various issues. Data for other adjustments are from U.S.  Bureau of 
Labor Statistics,  Wage Chronology,  for  each employer or association, bulletins 1815 and supplement, 
1682 and supplement, 1915, 1849 and supplement, 1895, 1934, 1762, 1787 and supplement, 1788 and sup- 
plement, 1904, 1814 and supplement, 1736 and supplement, 1960, 1953, and 1799 and supplement, respec- 
tively (as listed in the table). 
a.  The base wage data used in the table 2 regressions  are from average hourly earnings for the indicated 
standard industrial classification, except as noted. 
b. Before 1958, an implicit base wage was calculated from information in the BLS  Wage Chronology 
for  the Aluminum Company of  America and the union, bulletin 1815 (GPO,  1974). 
c.  The base wage is from the BLS  Wage Chronology  for North Atlantic longshoremen, bulletin 1736 
(GPO, 1972), and supplement. 
d. The base wage is from the BLS Wage Chronology  for the Pacific Maritime Association and the union, 
bulletin 1960 (GPO, 1977). 
c.  The base wage data are from an index of wage rates in the Great Lakes region for truckdrivers  and 
helpers in BLS, Union Wages  and Hours: Local Truckdrivers  and Helpers (GPO), various issues. The index 
applies to July 1 of each year and was adjusted for timing from increments reported in various issues of 
Current Wage Developments. 